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UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONFLICT




PARADOXICALLY, a significant virtue-or apparent virtue-of the law of con-
flict of laws is a by-product of the worst features of the system. When univer-
sal choice-of-law rules are employed to determine "what law governs," prob-
lems are created that did not exist before, and -the real problems are "resolved"
without regard to the purposes (or even the content) of the laws involved and
the interests of the respective states in the effectuation of their policies.' Pre-
cisely because of this indifference to legislative purpose and state policy, the
system appears as one of cool and dispassionate impartiality. All persons are
treated alike; the alien is placed upon an equal footing with the citizen. If the
validity of a contract is determined by the law of the place of contracting; if
the consequences of a tort are determined by the law of the place of harm; if
matters of procedure are determined by the law of the forum-then problems
of invidious discrimination apparently cannot arise. Even when the factor
determining choice of law is domicile-which in the United States is synony-
mous, for American citizens, with state citizenship--the serene impartiality of
the system is unruffled. The law of the domicile is called for whether it be the
law of the forum or of a foreign state, and it has apparently never occurred to
anyone to suggest seriously that it is invidious thus to treat persons differently
because they have their homes in different states.
2
On the other hand, when, employing an alternative method of analyzing con-
flict-of-laws problems, we inquire into the policies expressed in laws, and into
the extent to which a state may reasonably assert an interest in the application
IProfessor of Law, University of Chicago.
tActing Assoc. Professor of Law 1960-1961, University of California (Berkeley).
1. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Lars Method, 25
U. Cm. L. Rlv. 227 (1958) ; Currie, Survival of Actions; Adjudication versts Autdn~ation
in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAx. L. R.v. 205 (1958); Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuxE L.J. 171; Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-
Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study it; Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DuKE L.J.
1, 41-55.
2. "But the [privileges-and-immunities] clause has nothing to do with the distinctions
founded on domicile!' Lenumon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 603 (1860).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of its policy to cases having foreign aspects, we quickly encounter problems of
discrimination. The alternative method, rejecting universal rules for choice of
law, seeks to determine the applicability of laws to cases having foreign ele-
ments -by the processes of construction and interpretation. Frequently it is clear
that the purpose of a law is to protect, or confer a 'benefit upon, one of the
parties to a transaction. It is equally clear that the benefit or protection is not
intended for all men everywhere, but only for those who by virtue of their
relationship to the state are within the legitimate scope of its governmental
concern. If the policy of such laws is to be effectuated, they must be applied
in such a way as to protect the intended beneficiaries. To apply them for the
protection of others, with whose welfare the state has no concern, may in some
situations constitute wise altruism, serving the long-term interests of the state;
in other situations such an application may be simply irrational, advancing no
governmental interest of any state; and in still other situations such application
may constitute intermeddling so officious and unjustified as to amount to a
denial of due process of law, or of full faith and credit to the laws of a sister
state.
It is of the essence of this approach .to problems in the conflict of laws that
we determine the intended beneficiaries of the law and, in general, insist upon
its application for their 'benefit. Yet the moment a state announces that the
benefits of its lavs will be reserved exclusively, or even primarily, for its own
citizens or residents, problems of discrimination arise. Differential treatment
of the citizen and the foreigner may 'be objectionable on ethical grounds; it
may be 'bad policy if the longterm interests of the state are taken into account;
it may also violate the privileges-and-immunities clause 3 or the equal-protec-
tion clause 4 of the 'Constitution. Yet differential treatment of some sort is
essential if laws are to be rationally administered and if the state is to main-
tain a decent respect for the legitimate spheres of responsibility of other states.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the extent to which the process of
construction or interpretation of domestic law in such a way as to advance
domestic interests in conflict-of-laws cases is limited by the constitutional pro-
hibitions against discrimination. In particular we shall 'be concerned with the
paradoxical -border area in which -the prohibitions against discrimination seem
at cross purposes with -the command of the due-process and full-faith-and-
credit clauses, that each state abstain from interference in the affairs of the
others. This paper will be primarily concerned with the privileges-and-im-
munities clause, the equal-protection clause being reserved for separate treat-
ment.
It is appropriate to add a word about the attitude with which we approach
the problem. In case of doubt we shall adopt for purposes of the discussion
that construction of the privileges-and-immunities clause (and later of the
equal-protection clause) which will most fully accomplish the constitutional
3. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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purpose to make this a single nation and to eradicate discrimination and the
disabilities of alienage. It happens that we espouse a conflict-of-laws method
which brings these troublesome problems to light. We do not, however, ap-
proach the problem defensively, in fear that the problems associated with dis-
crimination will vitiate the method. We have no wish to minimize the difficulty
of the problems, nor to obviate any of them by a narrow reading of the great
constitutional guaranties of fairness and equality. A characteristic of the method
is inquiry into how a state would resolve conflict-of-laws problems if its sole
objective were to effectuate its own policies and advance its own interests. This
inquiry is made not because we value selfishness and provincialism but because
it contributes to clear analysis of the problems of conflict of laws. It allows us
to measure the extent to which states do not act in furtherance of their own
interests, and to seek an explanation for their failure to do so in various situa-
tions. The explanation may sometimes be -that the courts are simply bemused
by an arbitrary system of choice-of-law rules which ignores state interests; it
may sometimes be that an enlightened spirit of altruism has dictated the avoid-
ance of discrmination, or that simplicity has been preferred to complexity in
law administration; or it may sometimes be that the desire to advance domes-
tic interests is restrained by the constitutional prohibitions against discrimi-
nation. The aim of the method is not to promote provincialism but to promote
the intelligent treatment of problems in the conflict of laws. The pursuit of
domestic interests must yield whenever it comes into conflict with the con-
stitutional prohibitions against discrimination; it may also be made to yield
when it comes into conflict with a deliberately reasoned policy of making the
benefits of domestic law available to all persons-where that can be done with-
out intrusion upon the concerns of other states. Whenever we make the state-
ment that a state should apply its protective laws when the person claiming
the benefit of the protective policy is a citizen, or resident, of the state, we
should like to be understood as adding that it should apply those laws also for
the protection of such other persons as are entitled under the Constitution to
parity of treatment with local citizens, and such others as the state may volun-
tarily and deliberately decide to accord parity of treatment-so long as such
altruism does not amount to officious interference in the affairs of other states.
In short, while this method rejects the system of choice-of-law rules, with its
indifference to state policies and interests and its apparent freedom from prob-
lems of discrimination, and counsels primary emphasis on the furtherance of
state interests, proponents of the method need not be embarrassed by the fact
that the Constitution imposes restraints upon the pursuit of state interests.
Rather they should welcome the restraints against discrimination that are made
possible -by the existence of a federal union.
The fact that these problems come immediately into view when conflicts
problems are approached in this way does not mean that they are generated by
the method. Indeed, their prompt appearance is ground for an inference that
they have -been present from the beginning, obscured and suppressed by the
traditional conflict-of-laws system. If we may at all reasonably speak of laws
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as embodying governmental policies, and of the ,human and rational tendency
of a community to apply the policies expressed in its laws in such a way as
to maximize the interests of the community, then the conditions -that give -rise
to problems of discrimination are present at all times. One would expect to
find, -then, -that the system of conflict-of-laws law has not succeeded in solving
such problems by suppressing and ignoring them. If the system worked per-
fectly, and if the factors that purportedly regulate the incidence of laws were
as meaningful as they are supposed to be, no problems of discrimination would
arise; but the system does not work and cannot 'be made to work, and one of
the reasons why this is so is that the conditions that give rise to problems of
discrimination exist notwithstanding the system's neglect of them, and that the
problems cannot be wholly ignored or suppressed.
The point is readily illustrated by two standard casebook cases on the Stat-
ute of Frauds. We are told -that the requirement of a writing
... may 'be a requirement of procedure or a requirement of validity, or
both. If, for instance, the statute of frauds of -the place of contracting is
interpreted as meaning that no evidence of an oral contract will 'be re-
ceived 'by the court, it is a procedural statute, and inapplicable in the
courts of any other state. . . If, 'however, the statute of frauds of the
place of contracting is interpreted as making satisfaction of the statute
essential to the 'binding character of the promise, no action can 'be main-
tained on an oral promise there made in that or any other state ....
We are not told 'how the court is to determine whether the statute in question
is substantive or procedural; perhaps the assumption is that the characteriza-
tion will be performed according to the hallowed literalism of Leroux v.
Brown.6 At any rate, once the statute has 'been characterized, the task is done.
The incidence of the statute has 'been determined. To put the matter in a dif-
ferent way, -the state whose law must govern has been ascertained. 7 If it 'be
true that for profound and mysterious .reasons--perhaps associated with The
Nature of Things, or "the first principles of legal thinking"S--the law of the
place .of contracting governs -the validity of the contract; and that the problem
5. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 334, comment b (1934). See also id., § 59,
comment a; id., § 602, comment a.
6. C. P. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1852).
7. The reader may be puzzled by this form of statement, shifting the discussion as it
does from the question of how the statute should be characterized to the question of
Which state's law should govern. The statement implies that the court has first character-
ized the problem before it as one pertaining to substance or procedure, from which it
follows that the law of the place of contracting or the law of the forum is applicable as
the case may be. Apparently the question still remains: What law of the place of con-
tracting? (To which the answer is, the mbstantive law.). Or what law of the forum?
(To which the answer is, the prdcedural law.). Hence it becomes necessary to determine
whether the statute of the place of contracting is substantive, and so on. We have no in-
tention of defending this one of the several mysteries of the system; that would involve
a kind of esoteric, scholastic disputation for which we have no taste. See RoDERTso,
CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 118-34, 253-59 (1940).
8. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
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presented to the court 'by a plea of the Statute of Frauds is a problem relating
to validity; and that the statute of the place of making relates to validity; and
if the court then consistently applies that statute to all contracts, and only con-
tracts, "made" within the state-then it is impossible to conceive of a problem
of discrimination. Cases are determined completely without reference to the
connections 'between the parties and the states involved. The law is no respecter
of persons. If the Tesult is that one citizen is treated differently from his neigh-
bor, the justification is obvious: he is treated differently only because a dif-
ferent law necessarily governs. What could be more reasonable than that?
Consider, however, what happens when a court which has not been mes-
merized by the system approaches the problem in a pragmatic way. The Su-
preme Court of Delaware said in Lams v. P. H. Smith Co.:
The Delaware Statute of Frauds... is primarily for the benefit of the
citizens of Delaware. It was the agreements or contracts of Delawareans
which were mainly sought to be protected from the future uncertainties
of oral testimony and the Legislature was not merely laying down a rule
of evidence for the Courts. If the necessity of writing be procedural then
while the lack of writing would prevent the enforcement of the contracts
in the -Courts of Delaware yet the Delaware citizen would still be liable
to be -harassed upon the contract and to be faced by oral testimony if sued
in the Courts of another State, the statute of which had been held to be
substantive. On the other hand, if the necessity of writing be construed
as one of the formalities of the contract, then the absence of the writing
would make the contract ... unenforceable in the Courts of Delaware,0
and, under principles of comity and conflict of laws, unenforceable outside
of the State and insure to the citizens for whose benefit the Act was
passed the full measure of protection.
Having in mind the clear intent of the Legislature to require contracts,
coming within the statute, to be executed with certain formalities and be-
lieving that the purpose of the Statute was not only the prevention of per-
juries but the deeper purpose of protection of its citizens from the effect
of such perjured testimony, we believe that the greatest measure of pro-
tection should be afforded to its citizens and so hold that the statute refers
to the substance or formality with 'which the contract must be executed. 0
Expediency? Opportunism? Manipulation of the system of conflict of laws
for the purpose of achieving a result desired on independent grounds? Qod
erat denwonstrandum. The purpose of the statute was to protect persons alleged
to have undertaken promissory obligations-not all such persons everywhere,
but only those with whose welfare Delaware was concerned. The court there-
fore determined to apply the statute in a way which it thought would to the
maximum extent possible secure its protection for domestic defendants; pro-
tection for foreign defendants was not a consideration. If a forthright declara-
tion that the statute would -be applied for the protection of local defendants,
9. This would be true only if the contract were made in that state; the court appar-
ently assumed that most contracts of Delawmare citizens are made in Delaware.
10. 36 Del. 477, 482-83, 487, 178 Ad. 651, 653, 655 (1935).
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irrespective of the place of contracting, would have raised problems of dis-
crimination against citizens of other states, so should this attempt 'to approxi-
mate the desired result by indirection. Moreover, it is no longer possible to
explain to the local citizen who 'has been held liable while his neighbor has
been protected that the circumstance that his contract was made in another
state necessitates the application of that state's law; nothing could be plainer
than that the applicable law has been determined not by fundamental prin-
ciples ,but simply according -to considerations of expediency. By resorting to
the technique of indirection and approximation the court deprived certain
Delaware citizens-those contracting outside the state-of the protection of the
law that was designed for their 'benefit. The place of contracting obviously does
not 'have the significance attributed to it by the system, since it can 'be deemed
controlling or not according to the court's estimate of the effect upon domestic
policy; hence it may be seriously questioned whether the classification is a rea-
sonable one, and whether the local citizen contracting abroad has 'been afforded
equal protection of the laws.
The reason for employing the technique of indirection and approximation
is twofold. In the first place, -the court no doubt felt compelled to Tesort to the
concepts of the conflict-of-laws system; the available alternatives were assumed
to be limited by the system. In the second place, the court probably felt that
constitutional problems, especially problems relating to discrimination, would
thus be avoided. It is instructive to analyze the decision in terms of the extent
to which it will approximate the legislative purpose to protect local defendants
and of its success in avoiding constitutional problems.
The opinion of ,the count treats three elements as important in determining
how to apply the statute in conflicts cases so as to achieve the legislative pur-
pose: the place of contracting; the -esidence (or citizenship) of the defendant;
and the place where the action is brought. Let us assume that only two states
TAmE- I
Case Place of Residence of Forum Result
Number contracting defendant
I New York Delaware Delaware Delaware defendant
not protected
2 New York Delaware New York Delaware defendant
not protected
3 New York New York Delaware New York defendant
not protected
4 Delaware New York Delaware New York defendant
protected
5 Delaware Delaware New York Delaware defendant
protected




are involved, Delaware and New York, and that New York's statute of frauds
is satisfied but Delaware's is -not. On these assumptions there are eight possible
combinations of the three factors, of which one is wholly domestic and one
wholly foreign to Delaware, leaving six mixed cases. Table I shows these
mixed cases and the result in each of the court's determination to treat the
statute as substantive, assumting that the New York courts will, as the Dela-
ware court supposed, accept its characterization of the Delaware statute and
faithfully follow ithe Tules of -the system.
Although the purpose is to protect Delaware defendants, no protection is
afforded in tvo of the three cases in which Delaware defendants appear. Al-
though there is no purpose to protect New York defendants, protection is
afforded in two of the three cases in which New York defendants appear. The
cases are not, of course, equally probable; none, however, is impossible. A
factor that bears heavily on the probability of any one of the cases is the feasi-
bility of suit in the state named as forum; but the court did not make the
forum a factor controlling the incidence of the statute."1 The extent to which
the decision will effectuate the protective policy depends, therefore, entirely
upon the correctness of the court's assumption that it is probable that con-
tracts by Delawareans will be made in Delaware. When the other party is a
resident of another state, however, there is no a priori basis for such an as-
sumption. Delaware defendants will be given the protection, and New York
defendants will be denied it, according to a factor determined by chance. The
effectiveness of -the strategy is therefore open to serious question.
The court did not mention the residence of the plaintiff as a factor to be
taken into account, but if we are to see the whole picture in terms of discrimi-
nation and other constitutional problems we should include such a factor. In
each of the eight possible cases the plaintiff may be a resident of Delaware or
of New York; of the resulting 16 possible cases, fourteen are mixed. If the
reader is interested in constructing for himself a table along the lines of Table
I he will find that the court's decision, on the same assumptions, produces the
following results:
1. The Delaware defendant is protected against the New York plaintiff in
two cases, and not so protected in two.
2. The Delaware defendant is protected against the Delaware plaintiff in
one case and not so protected in two. 2
U1. Although the quotation in the text at note 9 mtpra may suggest an inclination to
hold the statute both procedural and substantive, that is not the holding. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to a plea invoking the Delaware Statute of Frauds. 36 Del. at 478,
487, 178 Ati. at 651, 655. A holding that the statute is both procedural and substantive
would protect the Delaware defendant in all cases except Case 2 and would protect the
New York defendant in all cases.
12. The lack of symmetry here and in Item 4 is occasioned by omission of the wholly
domestic and wholly foreign cases. If we were dealing with the entire array we would
say that .the Delaware defendant is protected against the Delaware plaintiff in two cases;
similarly, the New York defendant would not be protected against the New York plaintiff
in two. See generally Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YA=z LJ. 137 (1955).
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3. The New York defendant is protected against the Delaware plaintiff in
two cases, and not so protected in two.
4. The New York defendant is protected against the New York plaintiff in
two cases, and not so protected in one.
A number of observations may be made concerning these results. First, even
if it be assumed that reserving the benefits of the statute for citizens of Dela-
ware and denying them to citizens of New York would amount to a denial of
the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, it would ,be almost impossible
to denounce -the court's decision on that ground, since its scheme to make the
statute operate in that way is so defective. So far as one can judge a priori,
the scheme will protect Delaware defendants about half of the time and New
York defendants about half of the time. Hence the court failed to effectuate
the legislative purpose that it had so clearly defined. Only to the extent that
the count's assumptions about the probabilities are correct will the scheme
approximate the desired result; but, to the extent that the assumptions are
correct, the problem of differential treatment of residents and nonresidents is
presented. In the case before the court the result was to deny the protection
of the statute to a Delaware corporation, the contract -having 'been made in
New York (Case 1, Table I). The residence of the plaintiff does not appear.
Second, the Delaware court has presumed to protect the New York defend-
ant from the New York plaintiff in two cases. In each the contract is made in
Delaware; the difference relates to the forum. In thus intruding itself into a
relationship with which it has no concern, defeating the expectations of the
New York plaintiff, contrary to New York policy, without advancing any in-
terest of its own, Delaware violates the due-process clause 13 or the full-faith-
and-credit clause,' 4 or both.15
Third, the Delaware court has denied the Delaware plaintiff the right to
recover against the New York defendant -in two cases. Why should it do so,
when no New York policy protects the New York defendant? The decision
advances the policy of neither state. Not only so; ,but in two other cases, in-
distinguishable except for the fact that the contract is made in New York in-
stead of Delaware, the Delaware plaintiff is permitted to succeed against the
New York defendant. Since the place of making has 'been shown to lack sig-
nificance, may not -the Delaware plaintiffs in the first ,two cases complain of
a denial of equal protection?
Fourth, -the Delaware defendant whose protection was the object of the
statute is protected in three cases and not protected in four. In two of the four
cases in which he is 'denied protection the plaintiff is a New York resident.
The result is to subordinate the policy of Delaware to that of New York-a
judicial curb on legislative policy which is not required by the Constitution,10
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
15. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial .Function, 26 U. CHi. L. REv. 9 (1958).
16. See Currie, supra note 15.
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and hence a rather obvious failure of the court to discharge its duty to give
the legislative policy full effect within constitutional limits.
Fifth, in the two other cases in which the Delaware defendant is denied pro-
tection the -plaintiff is also a Delawarean. Delaware alone is concerned. No
policy of any other state is involved, whether the action is brought in Delaware
or New York.17 The sole ground for treating this case differently from the
ordinary domestic case for which the statute was primarily intended is that the
contract was made in New York. How would such a case arise in real life ?
Tvo Delaware businessmen negotiating on a train in New York? Or meeting
at lunch in New York City for convenience? A resident of Delaware, about
to graduate from Columbia Law School, accepting by telephone an offer of
employment from a Delaware law firm? When the plaintiff is a New Yorker,
denial of the protection of the statute to the Delaware defendant may perhaps
be defended against attack based on the equal-protection clause by the argu-
ment that avoidance of conflict with the policy of a sister state justifies the
classification (though Delaware does not consistently avoid such conflicts, but
asserts its own policy in opposition to that of New York when the contract is
made in Delaware); ,but here, where no conflicting policy of the other state is
involved, is not the treatment of some Delaware defendants differently from
others simply arbitrary ?18 The point is not merely that the circumstance of
contracting in a foreign state is especially fortuitous when both parties are
residents of Delaware, but, again, that the opinion of the court itself treats the
place of making as significant only in so far as making it the controlling factor
will advance the policy of Delaware.
The second case, Emery v. Burbank,'0 is especially interesting because it is
one in which i1olmes, so often a rigid conceptualist in matters of conflict of
laws, employed a predominantly pragmatic approach. The action was upon an
oral agreement, allegedly made in Maine by the defendant's testatrix, to the
17. Our assumption is that the New York statute is satisfied, so that even if it is
"procedural," New York would not interpose it.
18. Here, as at several other points in this paper, we oversimplify the problem by
speaking of the parties as individuals. To explore fully the complication introduced by
the variety of ways in which a corporation may be related to a state would unduly extend
the present study. If two essentially New York business enterprises are incorporated in
Delaware for convenience, a contract entered into between them in New York would clearly
be a matter of concern to New York, while Delaware's interest might be regarded as
nominal only. Congress recently dealt with this type of problem in the context of diversity
jurisdiction by treating a corporation as a.citizen not only of the state of incorporation
but also of the -tate where it has its principal place of business. Act of June 25, 1958,
PL 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415,28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). A similar solution might be worked
out for some conflict of laws problems by legislation or by analogy. Perhaps we might
go further in conflicts cases and deny any interest to the state in which a foreign enter-
prise is incorporated for convenience, although that seems rather a matter for congressional
legislation. For purposes of this paper we shall assume that a corporation is to be treated
as domiciled in the state of incorporation, with all the benefits and burdens that such
domicile entails.
19. 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895).
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effect that, if the plaintiff would leave Maine and take care of the testatrix,
she would leave the 'plaintiff all her property at her death. The trial court ruled
that the action could not be maintained because of a Massachusetts statute
providing: "No agreement to make a will of either real or personal estate, and
no agreement to give a legacy, or make a devise 'by will, shall 'be binding, tuin-
less such agreement is in writing signed by the party whose executor, or ad-
ministrator is sought to be charged, or by some person by such party duly
authorized." 20 Although a literal reading of ,the statute would indicate that it
was addressed to the validity of the contract, although the contract itself was
required to 'be in writing (a "note or memorandum thereof" would not suf-
fice),21 and although the statute expressly provided against any effect on con-
tracts made prior to its passage,2 Holmes, writing for the Supreme Judicial
Court, affirmed:
But the statute evidently embodies a fundamental policy. The ground, of
course, is the prevention of fraud and perjury, which are deemed likely
to be practiced without this safeguard. The nature of the contract is such
that it naturally would be performed or sued upon at the domicil of the
promisor. If the policy of Massachusetts makes void an oral contract of
this sort made within the State, the same policy forbids that Massachu-
setts testators should be sued here upon such contracts without written
evidence, wherever they are made.
If we are right in our understanding of the policy established 'by the
Legislature, it is our duty to carry it out so far as we can do so without
coming into conflict with paramount principles.
2 3
In our view, the statute, whatever it expresses, implies a rule of pro-
cedure 'broad enough to cover this case.
Thus the Massachusetts court's estimate of the probabilities, in this different
type of case, was different from the Delaware court's estimate; and according-
ly the characterization of the statute needed to effectuate the policy was dif-
ferent. Most actions for breach of contracts 'by Massachusetts decedents to
make a will were likely to be brought in Massachusetts: thus to treat the
statute as procedural would protect Massachusetts testators (or those inter-
ested in their estates) in the great majority of the cases. Especially in 1895,
there was an objective basis for this estimate, since in the typical case the
estate, or the bulk of the estate, of a decedent was likely to be administered
at 'his domicile, which was the only place where the personal representative
could 'be sued. Thus characterization of the statute as procedural probably did
tend -to approximate effectuation of Massachusetts policy. In addition, Holmes
declared himself prepared to go even farther in protecting Massachusetts resi-
dents, and yet to stop short of imposing -the Massachusetts policy where it
would not serve her interests. He very pointedly suggested that the statute
20. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1888, ch. 372, § 1.
21. 163 Mass. at 328, 39 N.E. at 1027.
22. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1888, ch. 372, § 2; 163 Mass. at 328, 39 N.E. at 1027.
23. 163 Mass. at 328-29, 39 N.E. at 1027.
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might well be construed as both procedural and substantive 2  (which would
at least announce to another state, wherein an ancillary administration of the
estate of a Massachusetts decedent might be pending, that Massachusetts
desired that an oral contract made in Massachusetts be treated as void). And
it was unnecessary to consider "whether... if, by some unusual chance, a suit
should happen to be brought here against an ancillary administrator upon a
contract made in another State by one of its inhabitants, the contract would
have to be in writing."25
Thus it is fair to say that Holmes's scheme tended substantially to effectuate
Massachusetts policy, and contemplated ,that the policy would not be intruded
where Massachusetts 'had -no interest. There is present nevertheless the as-
sumption that the policy must be effectuated through employment of the con-
cepts of the system, and -that the alternatives are limited thereby; one must
not quite say forthrightly that the statute will always be applied in such a way
as to protect Massachusetts residents to the full extent of the power of the
state to do so. The solution must be stated in terms of substance or procedure,
or both. As a result there remains one situation in which the Massachusetts
resident will not be protected: the contract is made in Maine and there is
ancillary administration in Maine. One may inquire whether failure to extend
the protection in this case comports with equal protection of the laws. -0 A pos-
sible answer is that in such a case protection is withheld from the Massachu-
setts resident by Maine, not by Massachusetts, so that there can be no asser-
tion that Massachusetts has dealt unequally with her residents; yet Holmes,
like the Delaware court, assumed that the construction given by the court to a
statute of its own state would control the decision of another court respecting
its application.
If it is -true that the Holmes scheme would substantially accomplish the pur-
pose of protecting Massachusetts residents while withholding the benefits of
the statute from others, then, despite the fact that the principle is formulated
in terms of substance and procedure, the case raises precisely the kInd of prob-
lem under the privileges-and-immunities clause that is the subject of this
paper.
The Holmes treatment raises still another constitutional problem. The in-
ference to be drawn from the statement of facts in Emery v. Burbank is that,
at the time the contract was made, the plaintiff was a resident of Maine and
the testatrix a resident of Massachusetts. Suppose, however, that at that time
both were ,residents of Maine, and that the testatrix had moved to Massachu-
setts after the contract had been partly ,performed.-27 Holmes faced this possi-
24. Id. at 328,39 N.E. at 1027.
25. Id. at 329,39 N.E. at 1027.
26. At this point we shall not deal with the problem of standing to raise the equal-
protection challenge. A similar problem is discussed below in connection vith Chambers
v. Baltimore & O.P-RR, 207 U.S. 142 (1907) (privileges-and- immunities clause). See
text at note 262 infra.
27. We have no intention of considering the argument that in such a case the contract,
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bility and accepted, though not without some regret, the consequences of the
position he had taken:
We do not draw the conclusion that ... the validity of all such contracts,
wherever sued on, must depend on the law of the domicil. That would
leave many such contracts in a state of indeterminate validity until the
testator's death, as he may change his domicile so ,long as he can travel.
But the consideration shows that the final domicil is more concerned in
the policy to be insisted on than any other jurisdiction, and justifies it in
framing its rules accordingly. There would be no question to be argued
if the law were in terms a Tule of evidence. It is equally open for a state
to declare, upon the same considerations which dictate a rule of evidence,
,that a contract must have certain form if it is to be enforced against its
inhabitants in its courts. 28
In other words, by construing the statute as procedural the court gave it the
effect of destroying rights under a contract made under such circumstances
that Massachusetts at the time it was made had no interest whatever in pro-
tecting the promisor. The problem raised by such a decision is substantially,
if not precisely, the same as that raised by an attempt to apply the same stat-
ute retroactively to wholly domestic cases: impairment of the obligation of the
contract.2 9 To the extent that the state may reasonably make such a statute
retroactive, it may apply it to cases in which it had no interest at the time of
the transaction; beyond this, its application to ,such cases does precisely the
same damage that is caused 'by unintended, unjustified, or unreasonable retro-
activity. If it is recognized that retroactive application of the statute is un-
constitutional, the evil of applying it in such a conflicts situation ought not to
be disguised by labeling the statute as "a rule of evidence." 0 Moreover, even
if this is assumed to be a case in which the state might legitimately adopt a
policy for the protection of all persons residing in the state at the time of the
act's passage, irrespective of when or where the alleged agreement was made,
it is worthy of note that Massachusetts declared no such policy, but expressly
limited the statute to prospective operation.3"
The constitutional problems that come into view when problems of conflict
of laws are approached in terms of analysis of governmental policies and in-
terests are not, therefore, problems that are merely generated by the method.
on the assumption that it was unilateral, would be "made" in Massachusetts upon completion
of performance by the plaintiff. Cf. RESTATEmENT, CONTRAcrs §§ 45, 74 (1932).
28. 163 Mass. at 329-30, 39 N.E. at 1027.
29. "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ..
U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 10; see Currie, The Constiltlion and the Choke of Law: Govern-
inental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cmi. L. Rgv. 9 (1958); Currie & Lieber-
man, supra note 1.
30. It seems possible that the theory of vested rights in conflict of laws originated
because of cases such as this, in which rights once settled are unsettled by a change of
circumstances or of law after the transaction. It is difficult to understand, however, how
the proponents of that theory managed to transplant it to the type of case in which two
states have a legitimate interest in the matter at the time of the transaction.
31. See note 22, supra.
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They exist irrespective of the method employed, though they are obscured by
the traditional method. Indeed, the traditional method generates constitutional
problems that would in all probability not arise if problems of "choice of law"
were -regarded simply as problems of the construction and interpretation of
laws, without reliance upon a mystical system purporting to shortcut ordinary
legal methods. But for that system-and specifically the felt compulsion to
frame decisions in terms of the system's concepts-it is unlikely that the Dela-
ware court would think of imposing its Statute of Frauds upon a transaction
betveen two New Yorkers, thereby raising a problem of due process and full
faith and credit, or of withholding the protection of the statute in a transaction
between two citizens of Delaware casually present in another state, thereby
raising a problem of equal protection. And but for that system and its con-
cepts it is difficult to believe that Holmes could have brought himself even to
contemplate, much less accept, the conclusion that rights acquired under a con-
tract valid by the law of the state in which both parties resided at the time of
contracting are destroyed, upon the promisor's removal to Massachusetts, by
a law intended to protect Massachusetts residents and not intended to have
retroactive effect.
It is an understatement to say that the problems of discrimination in the
conflict of laws have been obscured by the system, with the result that little
attention has been given to them by courts or legal writers. So subtly do the
concepts of the system obscure realities that in 1903 the Illinois legislature was
able to enact a statute designed to protect residents of Illinois, in general,
against liability for the wrongful deaths of residents of other states-arbitrarily
discriminating, to that end, against certain Illinois residents-and for half a
century courts and legal writers did not understand the legislative purpose.3-
In this investigation we shall have to do the best we can with the limited
materials that are available.
II. THE PRIvILEGEs AND ImmUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP
1. The character of the privileges and imnmunitics securcd. The privileges-
and-immunities clause of article IV,33 an abridged version of a clause of similar
purport in the Articles of Confederation, 34 is not among the more definitively
32. Ill. Laws 217-18 (1903) (now 11... REv. STAT. clh. 70, § 2 (1957)). The statute
was held violative of the full-faith-and-credit clause in First Nael Bank v. United Air
Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), but a more -intelligible basis for its invalidity is furnished
by the equal-protection clause. See Currie, Thc Cdnstitution and the "Transitory" Cause
of Action, 73 HAv. L Rxv. 36 (1959).
33. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. The clause should not be
confused with the provision of .the fourteenth amendment that "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States... :' U.S. Co.qsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see note 38 infra.
34. The ,better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of these states, paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
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glossed provisions of the Constitution.35 Judicial interpretation of the clause
got off to a bad start when Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington, Tiding circuit
in 1825, felt called -upon to expound his reasons for believing that it did not
prevent New Jersey from denying to nonresidents the privilege of taking oys-
ters from the waters of the state.30
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed 'by the citizens of the several states which
and inmunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impo-
sitions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such
restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported
into any state, to any other state of which the Owner is an inhabitant; provided
also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any state, on the
property of the united states, or either of them.
ARTicLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
35. See generally CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMmRIcA-
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 686-93 (1953). The meager constitutional history of the
provision is found in 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 135, 173-74, 187,
443, 456, 577, 601, 637, 662, (1911) ; 3 id. at 112, 445-46; 4 id. at 61. Little can be gleaned
from these materials except that the framers deliberately omitted the language of the
Articles relating to the "removal of property imported into any State, to any other
State of which the owner is an inhabitant." Note 34 supra. Apparently the purpose of
that provision was .to guarantee the right of a slaveholder to remove his human chattels
from a free state. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, wished to retain some such
provision, 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra at 443, but the clause was adopted without it. The
only concession to his point of view was the -provision of article IV relating to fugitive
slaves. See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
From a different source one may infer that the principal object of the framers in
modifying the language of the clause in the Articles was to prevent a minority of states
having liberal naturalization policies from conferring upon aliens the rights of citizen-
ship in all the states. The key move in the correction of this objectionable practice was
the grant to Congress of the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. But the privileges-and-immunities clause of the Articles required amend-
ment also, since it bestowed the privileges of citizenship not only upon citizens of the
other states but also upon their "free inhabitants," and in one place upon "the people"
of each state. See note 34 supra. By providing for a uniform rule of naturalization and
by limiting the privileges-and-immunities clause to citizens, the framers made it impossible
for one state to control the policies of the others regarding aliens. See THE FEDE A LIST,
No. 42 (Madison); 3 STRY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTuTION 673-74 (1833). Left
unsolved was the problem of one state's conferring citizenship upon native-born Negroes,
thus enabling them to claim the rights of citizenship in slave states. In the course of
the debates on the Missouri Compromise, Charles Pinckney, admitting authorship of the
privileges-and-inmunities clause, stated that, while he could not recall the exact purpose
of the framers, -the idea of Negro citizenship was so remote that it could not have entered
into consideration. ANNALS OF CONG. 1129, 1134 (1821), FARRAND, op. cit. supra at
445-46; see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417-19 (1856).
36. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign.3r
A gentle critic has commented that "The vagaries and vagueness of thought
and expression in -this statement are obvious." 38 One may add that the state-
ment was wholly unnecessary to the decision, since, after disposing of this and
other constitutional questions, the court entered judgment for the defendant
for the sufficient reason that the owner of the condemned vessel could not
maintain the possessory action of trespass for a seizure occurring while it wvas
in -the possession of a ,bailee.39 Moreover, the disquisition on "fundamental"
rights was not called for in the discussion of any question of privileges and
irmunities presented by the facts of the case. It would have been sufficient to
say, as M-. Justice Washington did at a later point, that since the right to
fish in the public waters of the state was "a right of property, vested .. . in
the state, for the use of the citizens thereof, it would... be going quite too
far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of citizens, as amounting
to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the state, to the citizens
of all -the other states." 40
Nevertheless, Washington's sonorous dictum at once became and for many
years remained the leading exposition of the clause,41 although some judges
and commentators noted cautiously that the meaning must be "determined in
each case upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied there n." '
The comprehensive language of the clause--"all privileges and immunities of
citizens"--was limited -to "fundamental" privileges; as the Supreme Court
said, "no privileges are secured by it, except those which belong to citizen-
ship."' 43 Not until 1898 did the Court give the clause a sufficiently broad con-
struction to make it a potentially significant influence upon the disposition of
ordinary conflict-of-laws cases.
In that year the Court decided Blake v. McClug," strildng down, in so far
as citizens of other states were concerned, a Tennessee statute giving priority
in -the distribution of local assets of an insolvent foreign corporation to cred-
itors resident in Tennessee. Mr. Justice Washington had compiled a list of the
37. Id. at 551.
38. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IowA L
BuL. 219, 228 (1918), reprinted in 2 AssocmnoN or Au. LAw SceooLs, SELEcrtm
EssAYs oN CoNsT TU=OAL LAw 40, 410 (1938).
39. 6 Fed. Cas. at 555.
40. Id. at 552. The property concept, apparently persuasive at the time, was much
impaired by Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 ('1948), discussed at notes 57, 94 infra.
41. See 3 STORY, CoMUENTARIES ON TE CoNs=TiToN 675 n.1 (1833); McGovney,
supra note 38, at 229; Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-77 (1872).
42. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855); McCready v. Virginia,
94 U.S. 391, 395 (1876); see CoOLEY, PRmcPLES or CoNsTITUToNAL LAw 188 (1880).
43. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1855).
44. 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
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privileges and immunities of citizenship that are "fundamental. '4 In it he
made no reference to the right to share ratably with other creditors of the
same class in the assets of an insolvent debtor, nor to any right of a closely
similar character. True, the list did not purport to be complete; but it is diffi-
cult to conceive of such a right as one which is, in its nature, fundamental,
and which has, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of all free govern-
ments.46 It is still more difficult -to conceive of it as a right which is distinctive
because it "pertains -to citizenship. '47 Perhaps for these reasons, Mr. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court, moved -his point of reference a step backward
in time: the -right impaired was the right to do business, to trade with the
corporation: "But the enjoyment of these rights is materially obstructed by
the statute in question; for -that statute, .by -its necessary operation, excludes
citizens of other States from transacting business with that corporation upon
terms of equality with citizens of Tennessee."4 8 This brought the case within
the penumbra of one of Mr. Justice Washington's items: "The right of a
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for pur-
poses of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise . "... ,,4 But
without question some of the original .breadth of the clause had been restored.
The rights secured were not merely those 'which are "fundamental," or which
inhere in citizenship as such; they include some ordinary legal rights estab-
lished for the people of the state in general; selfish and provincial discrimina-
tion is prohibited. So clear was this enlargement of the scope of the clause that
Mr. Justice Harlan felt called upon to add a caveat: "We must not 'be under-
stood as saying that a citizen of one State is entitled to enjoy in another State
every privilege that may be given in the latter to its own citizens."50 It is sig-
nificant that the dissenting justices did -not challenge this enlarged conception
of the character of the privileges and immunities secured ,by the clause; they
objected only (1) that -the classification was not in terms of citizenship but of
residence, and (2) that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the power of
the state to regulate -the terms upon which foreign corporations might ,be ad-
mitted to do 'business in the state. 1
After Blake v. McClung it was reasonable for Professor McGovney to offer
the following paraphrase of the clause as a reasonably accurate rendition of its
meaning in -the light of judicial interpretation:
Every right, privilege or immunity created 'by any State in 'behalf of its
own citizens shall be equally extended to the citizens of other States if
45. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
46. Cf. text at note 37 supra.
47. Cf. text at note 43 supra.
48. 172 U.S. at 253.
49. 6 Fed. Cas. at 552; cf. THE FEDERALIST, No. 42 (Madison) ("[Wihat was meant
(in the Articles of Confederation] by superadding to 'all privileges and immunities of free
citizens,' 'all the privileges of trade and commerce,' cannot easily be determined.").
50. 172 U.S. at256. (Emphasis in-the original.)
51. 172 U.S. at 262-69.
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withholding it would hinder free social and economic intercourse between
the citizens of the several States as one nation.52
Apart from Blake v. McClung, however, there are relatively few square hold-
ings by the Supreme Court defining and protecting the privileges secured by
the clause.53 These may be summarized briefly:
(a) A Maryland statute levying upon nonresident traders a license tax
twice as great as the maximum -tax payable by residents was held void as
applied to a citizen of New Jersey.54
(b) A Tennessee statute imposing a higher privilege tax on construction
enterprises having their chief offices outside the state than on those having
-their chief offices within the state was held invalid as applied to a citizen of
Alabama_ 5
52. McGovney, supra note 38, at 219-20. (Original emphasis omitted.)
Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts and Black, J'J.):
At one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights which,
according to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as 'natural rights'; and
that the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United States
by guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of this group of rights
by every other State. Such was the view of Justice Washington.
While this description of the civil rights of the citizens of the States has been
quoted with approval, it has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does
not import that a citizen of one State carries with him into another fundamental
privileges and immunities which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his
citizenship in the State first mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State
every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities
which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, prevents a State from
discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own."
53. For decisions of state and lower federal courts, see Meyers, The Prkilcges and
Immunities of Citizens in the Several States (pts. 1-2), 1 Mir. L. Rzv. 286, 364 (1903);
Note, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 347 (1928).
54. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wal.) 418 (1870). The question of validity
in terms of the commerce clause was expressly left open. Id. at 429.
[T]he defendant might lawfully sell, or offer or expose for sale, within the district
described in the indictment, any goods which the permanent residents of the
State might sell, or offer or expose for sale in that district, without being subjected
to any higher tax or excise than that exacted by law of such permanent residents.
Id. at 430.
55. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
As the chief office of an individual is commonly in the State of which he is a citizen,
Tennessee citizens engaged in constructing railroads in that State will ordinarily
have their chief offices therein, while citizens of other States so engaged will not.
Practically, therefore, the statute under consideration would produce discrimination
against citizens of other States by imposing higher charges against them than
citizens of Tennessee are required to pay.
Id. at 527. The Court's willingness to detect discrimination may have been influenced by
the unusual way in which the question of validity arose: the contractor had been denied
the right to recover $9,403.80, to which the jury had held he was entitled on the basis of
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(c) A New York statute taxing the income of nonresidents from sources
within the state, but not allowing nonresidents the exemptions allowed resi-
dents, was held invalid as applied to citizens of New Jersey and Connecticutr 0
(d) A South Carolina statute imposing on nonresidents 'higher license -fees
than on residents for commercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime
belt off the South Carolina coast was held invalid as applied to citizens of
Georgia. 57
Perhaps the 'best advertised of the privileges and immunities of citizenship
is the right to travel freely among the states. The Supreme Court 'has vindi-
cated this right of "ingress and egress," but never in terms of article IV. In
Crandall v. Nevada 58 a tax upon every person leaving the state was held in
conflict with the implied Tight of a citizen to travel in connection with the
affairs of the national government; and in Edwards v. California 60 a statute
making it a criminal offense to bring an indigent nonresident into the state
was held in conflict with the commerce clause. Four members of -the Court
quantum meruit, on -the ground that, not having paid the tax, he was guilty of a mis-
demeanor, so that the defense of illegality prevailed. Wright v. Jackson Constr. Co., 138
Tenn. 145 (1917), rev'd and remanded, 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
56. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920). Although the Court
refers only to "residents" of those states, the complaint alleged both residence and citizen-
ship. Record p. 24, Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra. The employer, who was
required to withhold the tax, was conceded standing to raise the constitutional question;
only by thus aggregating the amounts withheld was the requirement of jurisdictional amount
satisfied. 252 U.S. at 74-75.
57. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876), discussed at note 64 infra, was distinguished on the ground that it concerned
oysters, which are not, like shrimp, migratory, "free-swimming" fish, and that it involved
inland waters rather than the marginal sea. 334 U.S. at 401. Nevertheless, the "owner-
ship" theory of McCready (and of Corfield v. Coryell, supra note 40) seems much dis-
credited. See 334 U.S. at 401-02.
In Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), the Court similarly invalidated a
statute of Alaska imposing a higher license tax on nonresident commercial fishermen than
on residents. In response to the argument that Alaska was not a state, the Court, assuming
for the sake of argument that Congress might relieve a territory of some of the obliga-
tions imposed by the Constitution upon the states, held that Congress had indicated no
intention of giving Alaska power to discriminate in ways forbidden to the states. Id. at
419-20. Thus the Court considerably impaired the authority of Haavik v. Alaska Packers
Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924).
For completeness mention may be made of a case having (it is to be hoped) purely
historical interest. Virginia enforced an act of the Confederacy confiscating a debt owed
by a Virginian to a citizen of Pennsylvania. The ,Court said: "And the constitutional
provision securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States could not have a more fitting application than in condemning as
utterly void the act under consideration here, which Virginia enforced as a law of the
Commonwealth ... ." Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 184 (1877).
58. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
59. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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concurred in the result on the ground that the privilege infringed was one of
national citizenship, protected by the fourteenth amendment.0°
The cases holding various rights and privileges not within the protection of
article IV are more numerous :01
(a) Louisiana validly restricted community ights in local property to resi-
dent married -women and women -married in the state.62
(.b) Wisconsin validly provided that during the absence of the defendant
from the state the statute of limitations should not run against the plaintiff,
if he were a resident of the state, but should run in such circumstances against
nonresident plaintiffs.6
(c) Virginia validly restricted to its own citizens the right to plant oysters
in the tidal rivers of the state."
(d) Arkansas validly provided for personal service on resident landowners,
and service by publication on nonresident owners, in proceedings to collect
taxes assessed by a levee district. 5
(e) South Carolina validly Testricted the right to carry on the insurance
brokerage business to residents of the state. 0
60. 314 U.S. at 177, 181. See generally Meyers, Federal Pri'ileges and Immunities:
Application to Ingress and Egress, 29 CoirN. L.Q. 489 (1944) ; Roback, Legal Barriers to
Interstate Migration (pts. 1-2), 28 CoRe. L.Q. 286, 4,3 (1943); Note, 55 HAMv. L. RL'.
873 (1942); Note, 53 HAv. L. Rnv. 1013, 1032-42 (1940). Elaborate dicta concerning
the privilege of ingress and egress in relation to the privileges-and-immunities clause of
article IV are found in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293-99 (1920). For further
discussion of the "privileges or immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment and its
relation to the "privileges and immunities" clause of article IV, see Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
61. Some cases, which might be classified as denying the protection of the clause to
the asserted privilege seem to hold that no discrimination %%-as established rather than
that the privilege is not a protected one. Downham v. Alex,andria Council, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 173 (1869); Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902); Maxwell
v. Bugbee, 250 US. 525 (1919); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
Notwithstanding -the language of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryel,
6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), a citizen of one state rather
obviously is not automatically entitled to vote in another. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162, 174 (1874) (dictum). Mr. Justice Washington must have had in mind
the right of a citizen of one state to become a citizen of another and thereafter enjoy the
franchise subject to nondiscriminatory regulations.
62. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
63. Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72 (1876). The Court did not notice
the point, urged by counsel, that the plaintiff, being a corporation, %%as not within the
protection of the clause. See note 73 infra.
64. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). The authority of the case is impaired
by Toomer v. Witsell, note 57 supra,
65. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907). The protesting defendants, citizens of
Georgia and Florida, claimed "the privileges and immunities of citizens of ... Arkansas," id.
at 250, but the Court spoke only of "rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United
States'" id. at 254; cf. Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Note, 28 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 347, 349 (1928).
66. La Tourette v. MMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
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(f) Minnesota validly provided that its "'borrowing" statute, barring suit
on a cause of action arising outside the state when it is barred 'by the law of
the state in which the cause of action arose, should not apply where the plain-
tiff was a citizen of Minnesota who had owned the cause of action since its
inception.6 7
(g) Oregon validly restricted nonresident married women to dower in
lands of which the husband died seized, while giving resident married women
dower in all lands of which the husband was seized at any time during the
marriage. 8
(h) Alaska validly imposed a license tax solely upon nonresident commer-
cial fishermen. 9
(i) New York validly denied to nonresidents the right to sue foreign cor-
porations, doing business within the state, on causes of action arising from
foreign torts.70
2. The persons protected and the governments restrained. The clause is
directed against action by the state as distinguished from action by private per-
sons.71 It affords no protection against action 'by the state of which the person
claiming the privilege is a citizen. 72 Corporations are not citizens within the
protection of the clause.78
Aliens are, of course, not within the protection of the clause, but certain
privileges secured by 'the clause to citizens of other states are secured to aliens
by virtue of the equal-protection clause and the federal power over immigra-
tion.74 Apparently no case has determined whether a citizen of the United
States, not a citizen of any state, is within the protection of the clause.76
As we have seen, the decisions of the Court have been inconclusive as to
whether the clause restrains action by territorial governments, 'but at the least
the 'Court will not infer a congressional intention to 'relieve such governments
of the obligations imposed upon the states in the 'absence of positive language
67. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U S. 553 (1920).
68. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922).
69. Haavik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924). The case is discredited
by Toomer v. Witsell and Mullaney v. Anderson, supra note 57.
70. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). The right of access
to courts, generally stated, is another of the much-heralded privileges secured by tile
clause. See generally Blair, The Do'drine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-A merican
Law, 29 COLUn. L. REv. 1 (1929) ; Comment, 37 YALE L.J. 983 (1928) ; Note, 41 HAi.
L. Rav. 387 (1928) ; Note, 8 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1923) ; Note, 17 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1903);
Annot., 32 A.L.R. 6 (1924).
71. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882).
72. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
73. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
239 (1898). A Massachusetts trust is treated in the same way. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277
U.S. 537 (1928).
74. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958).
75. Cf. Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1912). There is a negative
dictum in Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 535 (1903).
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to that effect.7 0 Only one case seems to have arisen involving alleged discrimi-
nation against nonresidents by the District of Columbia, and the Court, find-
ing the classification reasonable, had no occasion to decide whether any pro-
vision of the Constitution proscribes discriminatory legislation by Congress.7
3. Classification in terms of residents and nonresidents rather than in terms
of citizens and noncitizens. In Blake v. McClung 78 the argument was made
that there could be no question of violation of the privileges-and-immunities
clause because the Tennessee statute discriminating in favor of local creditors
was couched in terms of residence rather than citizenship. In one sense this
was a strange argument: discriminatory statutes are typically drafted in terms
of residence; of the cases in which the Court had previously considered the
privileges-and-immunities clause only one involved a statute discriminating in
terms of citizenship, and -there the statute was upheld.70 In the earlier cases
the Court had simply assumed that discrimination against nonresidents was
tantamount to discrimination against citizens of other states. In another sense
the argument had a -force deserving more consideration than it received at the
hands of the ,Court. As Mr. Justice Brewer pointed out in dissent, residence
and citizenship are not synonymous ;80 a citizen of Ohio, or a subject of Great
Britain, residing in Tennessee, would be given the same priority as a resident
citizen of Tennessee, while a citizen of Tennessee residing in Ohio or Great
Britain would be treated like other nonresident creditors.
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, hardly did justice to this
argument First he confusingly discussed a different question: whether the
complaining creditors had established that they were citizens of other states,
and so had standing to raise the constitutional question. Although the record
was not all -that might be desired in this regard, he concluded that they had.
He then proceeded -to construe the Tennessee statute, concluding that the
words "residents of this State" referred to "those whose residence in Tennes-
see was such as indicated that their permanent home or habitation was there,
without any present intention of removing therefrom, and having the intention,
when absent from that State, to return thereto; such residence as appertained
to or inhered in citizenship."81 While it is true that the Tennessee legislature
might have used the word "residence" in the sense of domicile, the appropriate
procedure would have been to leave that question of construction to the state
76. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
77. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909); cf. Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
78. 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
79. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). In Corfield v. Coryell, supra note
35, the discrimination was in terms of "inhabitants." In Ward v. Maryland, supra note 54,
it was in terms of "permanent residence." Among the cases decided after Blake v. McClung,
supra note 78, again only one, Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920), involved
a statute discriminating in favor of local "citizens." There, also, the statute was upheld.
See text at note 97 infra.
80. 172 U.S. at 263; see Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 143 (1905).
81. 172 U.S. at 247.
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court, and not for the Supreme Court to volunteer its own construction-
especially one that would Tender the statute unconstitutional. 2 Finally Mr.
Justice Harlan distorted the argument, fabricating and then ridiculing the
proposition that -the statute was intended to disfavor only those creditors who
resided in, without 'being citizens of, other states.
It is difficult to understand why Mr. Justice Harlan, ordinarily one of the
more clear-headed and articulate of judges, should have taken a position so
confused and evasive. The only explanation that readily suggests itself is that,
while 'he knew instinctively that the statute was -fatally discriminatory, he had
not thoroughly thought out the reasons why the vice could not be cured by
substituting residence -for citizenship as the basis for classification.
The question that Mr. Justice Harlan did not answer at all was whether
the statute would survive attack under the privileges-and-immunities clause if
it were construed by the Tennessee court as distinguishing 'between residents
and nonresidents, and not -between citizens and noncitizens, with strict ad-
herence to the distinction that had been formulated by the federal courts in
diversity cases. In all probability this question should 'be answered negatively,
for two reasons: (1) In the typical state the overwhelming majority of resi-
dents are also citizens; residents who are aliens, or citizens of other states, are
the exception rather than the rule; and so the general tendency and effect of
the statute was to accomplish a discrimination in favor of local citizens and
against citizens of other states; and (2) even granting that the statute did not
operate to discriminate against citizens of other states as such, the circum-
stance of residence was not significant -in terms of any legislative policy other
than a policy of raw discrimination; hence the classification was arbitrary. The
second of these reasons is rather subtle, and difficult to 'formulate. It is the
reason that emerges somewhat tortuously -from later decisions, and its meaning
and sphere of application are still obscure. It is not surprising, 'therefore, that
Mr. Justice Harlan was unable, when the question first arose, to give a defini-
tive exposition of his reasons for 'feeling that the unconstitutional discrimina-
tion was not -relieved by classification in terms of 'residence.
The problem was next sharply presented in La Tourette v. McMaster.8a
The South Carolina Supreme Court had relied upon the distinction rejected
by the 'Court in Blake v. McClung:
[A] citizen of any State of the Union who is a resident of this State
and 'has been a licensed insurance agent of this State for at -least two years
may obtain a broker's license; on the other 'hand, a citizen of this State,
who is not a resident of the State and has not been a licensed insurance
agent of this 'State for two years, may not 'be licensed. No discrimination
is made on account of citizenship. It rests alone on residence in the State
and experience in -the business. 84
82. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R, 279 U.S. 377, 386 (1929).
83. 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
84. 104 S.C. 501, 506, 89 S.E. 398, 400 (1916), quoted in 248 U.S. at 469-70.
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Superficially, the opinion of the Supreme Court seems to rest upon this dis-
tinction:
The court thus distinguishes between citizens and residents and decides
that it is the purpose of the statute to do so and, by doing so, it avoids
discrimination. In other words, it is the effect of the statute that its re-
quirement applies as well to citizens of the State of South Carolina as to
citizens of other States, residence and citizenship being different things.80 5
But the distinction, on its face, is disingenuous and specious. If it were pos-
sible to escape the constitutional restraint by the simple device of substituting
residence for citizenship as the basis of classification, the clause would be
rendered nearly meaningless in practical effect. And the fact is that both the
South Carolina court and the Supreme Court pointed to considerations provid-
ing a more substantial basis for upholding the statute. The licensing provision
was part of a comprehensive scheme of regulation whereby the insurance
brokerage business was to be carried out under the supervision of the insur-
ance commissioner. According to arguments accepted by both courts, the pro-
gram could be carried out most effectively if the subjects of regulation were
residents of the state. The classification, therefore, had "practical justifica-
tions"--nonresidents were not excluded simply because they were foreigners
who were not to be allowed to compete with local businessmen, but because
only resident brokers could be effectively policed. This, at any rate, the legis-
lature could have found, and the Court's acceptance of such a finding is in
accordance with normal practice in constitutional cases. The circumstance of
residence had no such significance, independent of simple discrimination, in
Blake v. McClung.
If one is inclined to believe that .this interpretation attributes too much
sophistication to the decision in La Tourette, and that the Court in that case
actually accepted the disingenuous argument that a classification in terms of
residence ipso facto avoids the constitutional restraint, it is instructive to note
that at the same term, just three months later, the Court struck down a statute
which discriminated in terms of the location of the chief office of the enterprise
taxed-a classification less likely, it seems, than one in terms of residence to
approximate discrimination in favor of local citizens.8s If a classification in
terms of residence escapes the prohibition of the clause, one in terms of a fac-
tor less closely associated with citizenship should do so a fortiori. In the
Court's view, the practical effect of the statute would be to discriminate against
citizens of other states. Again, the factor determining the classification had no
significance except in respect of ,discrimination: "We can find no adequate
basis for taxing individuals according to the location of their chief offices-the
classification, we think, is arbitrary and unreasonable."87
85. 248 U.S. at 470.
86. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.V. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
87. Id. at 527.
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In the following term, however, the Court again gave evidence that it was
impressed by the argument that a classification in terms of residence escapes
the constitutional restraint. A statute providing that the graduated inheritance
tax applicable to New Jersey property of nonresident decedents should be
computed with reference to the total value of the estate was found not to in-
volve any discrimination, but rather a sincere attempt to achieve approximate
equality. Having thus disposed of the point, the Court noted that it was unneces-
sary to decide whether the decision might not be rested on a much narrower
ground, and added:
The alleged discrimination, here complained of, so far as privileges and
immunities of citizenship are concerned, is not strictly applicable to this
statute because the difference in the method of taxation rests upon resi-
dence and not upon citizenship. La Tourette v. McMaster."8
Nevertheless, only four months later the ,Court struck down a New York in-
come tax law although it discriminated only in terms of residence:
Of course the terms "resident" and "citizen" are not synonymous, and
in some cases the distinction is important (La Tourette v. McMaster... ) ;
but a general taxing scheme such as the one under consideration, if it
discriminates against all non-residents, has the necessary effect of includ-
ing in the discrimination those who are citizens of other States; and, if
there 'be no reasonable ground for the diversity of -treatment, it abridges
the privileges and immunities to which such citizens are entitled. 0
Rather clearly, the South Carolina statute in La Tourette also 'had the "neces-
sary effect of including in -the discrimination those [nonresidents] who are
citizens of other States"; hence the only meaningful distinction is that in the
one case there was a reasonable basis for the classification while in the other
there was none. 0
Again in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.91 the Court, speaking this
time through Mr. Justice Holmes, seemed to accept the specious argument that
a classification in terms of residence deflects the force of the prohibition
against discrimination, but at the same time pointed out that the statute in
question had a purpose other than merely to discriminate against foreigners,
and that residence was a factor relevant to -that purpose. In the quotation that
88. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1919).
89. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1920).
90. In Haavik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924), the Court again
sustained a discrimination couched in -terms of residence, holding that "citizens of every
State are treated alike." Id. at 515. The classification was deemed "not wholly arbitrary
or unreasonable," since preference was given to those who had acquired residence in
Alaska, and Alaska might legitimately encourage those upon whose efforts the future
development of the Territory depended. Ibid. But any state might similarly argue in
defense of raw discrimination that its growth depends upon the encouragement of local
entrepreneurs. The Haavik case has been in effect overruled by Mullaney v. Anderson,
342 U.S. 415 (1952).
91. 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
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follows the tvo ideas are strangely mixed; we have emphasized the language
relating to the "practical justifications" of the classification:
Construed as it has been, and we believe will be construed, the statute
applies to citizens of New York as well as to others and puts them on the
same footing. There is no discrimination between citizens as such, and
none between non-residents with regard to these foreign causes of action.
A distinction of privileges according to residence may be based upon
rational considerations and has been upheld by this Court, emphasizing
the difference between citizenship and residence, in La Tdurette v. Mc-
Master.... It is true that in Blake v. McClung... 'residents' was taken
to mean citizens in a Tennessee statute of a wholly different scope, but
whatever else may be said of the argument in that opinion (compare p.
262, ibid.) it cannot prevail over the later decision in La Tourette v. Mc-
Master, and -the plain intimations of the New York cases to which we
have referred. There are nanifest reasons for preferring residents in
access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact
that broadly speaking it is they who pay for inaintaining the Courts con-
cerned.92
In Todmer v. Witsell 93 the state did not even contend that since the statute
was couched in terms of residence it was outside the scope of the privileges-
and-immunities clause; instead it tried unsuccessfully to show that residence
-was a factor relevant to a nondiscriminatory policy. The Court agreed that the
distinction between residence and citizenship would be without force "in this
case,"9 4 and Mr. Chief Justice Vinson formulated the clearest statement thus
far of the "reasonable classification" principle:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immuni-
ties clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens
of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does
not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are
perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case
must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the
degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must
also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the
States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in pre-
scribing appropriate cures.95
The idea -that the clause does not Teach discrimination couched in terms of
residence has puzzled commentators from the beginning. 0 The time has come,
we believe, for the flat rejection of that idea. The constitutionality of a law
92. Id. at 387.
93. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
94. Id. at 397.
95. Id. at 396.
96. See Meyers, supra note 53, at 364, 382-83; Note, 17 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1903);
Note, 28 COLIJ-d. L. REv. 347 (1928); Note, 8 AfmNN. L REv. 47 (1923); Note, I Mu;..
L. Rv. 365 (1917); Note, 2 N.Y.U.L REv. 6 (1925); Note, 41 HLnv. L REv. 387
(1928) ; Comment, 37 YALE L.J. 983 (1928); Blair, supra note 70.
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treating local people differently from the people of other states is not saved by
the draftsman's choice of the word "resident" instead of the word "citizen,"
nor 'by the technical concepts which keep the category "residents" from being
precisely congruent with the category "citizens." It is saved only if the classi-
fication is reasonable, and is relevant to a policy other than one of parochial
and hostile discrimination against the outlander. It may 'be that residence is
a factor that can 'be reasonably related to legitimate policy more often than can
citizenship; but it is not true that citizenship can never 'be so related. This is
demonstrated by the fact that, at the time when (the Court was most pre-
occupied with -the distinction 'between residence and citizenship, it sustained a
statute discriminating in terms 'in favor of local "citizens." 0 7 It did so 'because
the classification was reasonable. Similarly, the decision in the Douglas case 08
would probably not have 'been different if the classification had been in terms
of citizenship instead of -residence. The Court might with equal propriety have
said, "There are manifest reasons for preferring citizens in access to often
overcrowded .Courts, ,both in convenience and in the fact 'that 'broadly speaking
it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned."0 0 If the result in
La Tourette would 'have been different if the classification had been framed
in terms of citizenship, that is only because it would 'be difficult to argue
plausibly that citizenship, as distinguished from -esidence, was relevant to the
efficiency of the regulatory scheme.
A further consideration supports this position. The degree of incongruence
that exists, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, between the categories of resi-
dents and of citizens is, in the context of 'problems of discrimination, reduced
to the vanishing point by other constitutional provisions. The advantages which
a state confers through its laws upon its "citizens" must, in general, also be
conferred upon resident aliens and resident citizens of other states, 'by virtue
of the equal protection clause and the supremacy clause. 00 Thus-subject, al-
ways, to the rule permitting reasonable classification-a statute conferring a
privilege of a protected character upon "citizens" of the state must 'be read as
extending the same privilege to all those entitled to equal protection of the
laws-that is, to all residents, at least. Hence the lack of congruence between
the categories of "citizens" and "residents" in the enacting state tends to dis-
appear. The fact that the disparity between the categories continues to exist
in other states is quite immaterial, since only a citizen of another state 'has
standing to invoke the privileges and immunities clause, whether the classi-
fication is in terms of residence or citizenship.
Since the test of constitutionality is the reasonableness of the classification,
the interesting conclusion is that the clause is to 'be administered according to
97. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920). La Tourelte, Chalker, Max-
well, and Travis were all decided in 1919-1920; see notes 83, 86, 88-90 supra.
98. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.PR.R, supra note 91.
99. Cf. id. at 387, quoted in text at note 92 supra.
100. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Conum'n,
334 US. 410 (1948).
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the same standards that govern the administration of the equal-protection
clause: a state is prohibited from denying the equal protection of the laws not
only -o all persons "within its jurisdiction" but also to all citizens of other
states. Or, to state the same proposition with more regard for historical
sequence, -the protection against discriminatory treatment that article IV gave
to citizens of other states vas extended by the fourteenth amendment to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the state. The charming simplicity of this
interpretation -is considerably disturbed, however, by the fact that citizenship
itself may constitute a -legitimate basis for classification.' 0 '
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LImITS ON STATE POWER AS A BASIS FOR
CLASSIFICATION
As all students of the conflict of laws know, when California applied its
workmen's compensation law to an injury suffered in Alaska by a nonresident
employee, the judgment was attacked as a denial of due process and a refusal
of full faith and credit to the laws of Alaska.-' Less well known is the fact
that earlier, when the California statute provided for compensating out-of-
state injuries only if the injured employee was a resident of California, the
statute was attacked as a denial to citizens of other states of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of California.10 3 These incongruous contentions illus-
trate well the dilemma that confronts one who would explore the effect of
constitutional restraints upon discrimination in conflict-of-laws cases. Surely
compliance with one constitutional mandate ought not to entail violation of
another; yet, as these contentions demonstrate,1° 4 the boundary between the
obligation of a state to respect the authority of other states and its obligation
to treat citizens of other states with impartiality has not been surveyed and
established.
101. The suggested interpretation may also be subject to qualification according
to the character of the right or privilege asserted; i.e., there probably are privileges
which may be denied to citizens of other states but not to persons "within the jurisdiction"
of the enacting state. This, however, seems no more than a manifestation of the para-
doical fact that classifications in terms of citizenship may be deemed reasonable in spite
of the apparent purpose of the privileges-and-immunities clause to outlaw them. Similarly,
classifications disfavoring aliens may survive attack based on the equal-protection clause
if the fact of alienage is reasonably related to legitimate policy. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); cf. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
102. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
103. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920),
urit of error dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921).
104. Ironically, both contentions were made by the same employer. Quong Ham
Wah Company was the "contractor" that performed the hiring function for Alaska
Packers Association; in the first case it was treated as the employer and was held primarily
liable. Record, pp. 3, 11, Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 255 U.S. 445
(1921); Brief of Plaintiff in Error, pp. 1-2, id.; cf. Brief of Defendant in Error, p. 1, id.
In the second case it was stipulated that Alaska Packers Association %was the employer,
and Quong Ham Wah was dismissed as defendant Record, pp. 57, 65, Alaska Packers
Ass'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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The earlier attack on -the statute, predicated on the privileges-and-immuni-
ties clause, succeeded. The later attack, mounted after the statute 'had been
broadened to include nonresidents, and predicated on the due-process and full-
faith-and-credit clauses, failed. Thus the conflict -between constitutional man-
dates that we have suggested as a possibility did not occur. It might very well
have occurred, however, if the &acts in -the second case, Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Ace. Comr'n,10 5 had been a little less unusual than they were.
The employee had been hired in San Francisco for short-term, seasonal em-
ployment in Alaska, at the conclusion of which he was to be returned to Cali-
fornia, where his wages were to be paid. Under these "special circumstances,"
presenting the danger that 'he might 'become a public charge or a burden upon
private interests in California, the Court found that California had "as great
an interest in affording adequate protection to this class of its population as -to
employees injured within the state."100 It is probable that if -the employee had
not ,been a member of California's migrant labor force, but simply a citizen of
a sister state, and if the contract had called for return transportation to his
home rather -than to California, the decision would have been different. 10 7 In
that event the due process and full-faith-and-credit clauses would have invali-
dated the application which, according to the Supreme Court of California,
the privileges-and-immunities clause required.
Any such result is so obviously intolerable that one or the other of the con-
stitutional interpretations must be rejected. No doubt there are some who
would be glad to use such a contretemps as an argument for rejecting the view
that the due-process and full-faith-and-credit clauses significantly limit the
power of a state to apply its own law in conflicts cases. 108 The effect of those
clauses, 'however, has recently 'been investigated, and we are persuaded that
they do impose a significant, though limited, restraint upon a state's choice of
law. In general, a state violates one or 'both of them when it applies its law in
a situation in which it has no legitimate interest in the application of its gov-
ernmental policies.10 9 We therefore propose to direct this inquiry primarily to
the -California court's interpretation of the privileges-and-immunities clause,
considering at the same time the extent to which analysis of the problem in
this context -requires qualification or extension of the conclusions previously
reached concerning due process and full -faith and credit.
At the outset it is necessary to notice a peculiarity of the problem as it is
presented in the context of workmen's compensation. In any discussion of
105. Note 102 supra.
106. 294 U.S. at 543.
107. Cf. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
See also Currie, The Constitutiom and the Choice of Law: Governmental Intcrests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 ('1958).
108. See 1 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 12 (1959); Currie, Book Revicw, 73
HARv. L. REv. 801 (1959).
109. See Currie, supra note 107.
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unconstitutional discrimination in the conflict of laws it is desirable to distin-
guish 'between the obligation of a state to provide a forum and its obligation
to afford the benefits of its laws. When the full-faith-and-credit clause requires
a state to provide a forum it is because of the respect due to the laws of a
sister state, and it follows that the laws of the sister state must also be applied
to measure the rights of the parties.110 When -the privileges-and-immunities
clause requires that a citizen of another state be permitted access to the courts
of the forum, however, there is no necessary implication regarding the law to
be applied; whether -the state must also extend to him the benefits of its laws
is a separate question. The two questions cannot, as a practical matter, be
separated in the typical workmen's compensation case. Especially where the
law is administered by a commission rather than a court, the application of
foreign -law is considered impracticable, and is ordinarily not attempted; and
while suit might be brought in the courts of the forum on the basis of a foreign
compensation law, such a remedy is thought to be so cumbersome by compari-
son with the administrative remedy under the law of the forum that it is hardly
to be considered a practical alternative.' Consequently, when we consider
whether the California act is -to be applied to nonresidents injured outside the
state, we are in substance considering also whether the nonresident is to be
given access to California tribunals; if the law of the forum is inapplicable,
the consequence is not that foreign law is applied, but that the proceeding is
dismissed. The result is that workmen's compensation cases provide a more
favorable setting for the argument that the nonresident should be protected
than cases involving choice of law alone.
In several respects the California privileges and immunities case, Quong
Ham Wah Co. v. Indwtrial Acc. Comm'n,12 was a remarkable decision. The
California statute provided:
The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising
out of injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state in those
cases where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of
the injury and the contract of hire was made in this state, and any such
110. See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HAM'.
L. REv. 36 (1959).
1.11. See Note, 6 VAN. L. REV. 744 (1953) ; Currie, mipra note 107, at 20 nA4. The
brief for the commission, after noting the obstacles to proceedings in Alaska brought by
migrant workers, added:
Such foreign laws could not be enforced in California before respondent Industrial
Accident Commission, as its jurisdiction is limited to the application of the Cali-
fornia Workmen's Compensation Act. As between the California Commission and the
California courts, the Commission affords a remedy, which for speediness and inex-
pensiveness, is very much preferable to that afforded by the courts.
Brief for Defendant in Error, p. 13, Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
255 'U.S. 445 (1921). Later the California court specifically held that the commission
could not apply the Alaska act. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, I Cal.
2d 250, 255, 34 P.2d 716, 718-19 (1934) ; cf. Currie, supra note 110.
112. Note 103 supra.
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employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation or death
benefits provided by this act." 3
The injured employee, Owe Ming, was a resident of California."4 The em-
ployer raised the objection under the privileges-and-immunities clause in the
hope that the section extending the coverage of the act to extraterritorial in-
juries would be fheld inoperative, thus freeing it of liability. The employer was
conceded standing to raise the question despite the fact that the proceeding
was by a resident rather than - citizen of another state, and despite the court's
own prior decisions 'holding that such a challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute "may not be 'aised -by one not belonging to the class alleged to be dis-
criminated against.""-5 The reason for making an exception to this rule was
twofold: (1) -if the consequence of denying parity of treatment to nonresidents
was that the section was void, the exaction of compensation for an out-of-state
injury to a -local resident was not authorized 'by law, and so was a denial of
due process of which the employer had standing to complain ;110 (2) where no
member of a class alleged to -be discriminated against is -in a position to raise
the constitutional question, any person affected 'by its application should be
able to challenge its constitutionality; only thus could -the court perform its
"ultimate and supreme function . . to declare unconstitutional statutes 'to be
void and of no effect .. .. ,,17 Whatever else may be said of the latter argu-
ment, it is difficult to understand why no member of the disfavored class was
in position to raise the question. If a nonresident injured outside the state had
applied for compensation and 'been refused, it is not at all clear why the deter-
mination should not be subject to review. 118
The first argument lost much of its force when the court, on rehearing,
reversed its holding that -the consequence of the discrimination was invalidity
113. Cal. Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 58, at 870 (now CAL. LAB. CoD- § 5305); cf, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3600.5; Storke & Sears, Reciprocal Exemption Proviins of Wcorkincn's Compen-
sation Acts, 67 YALE L.J. 982 (1958).
114. Record, p. 8, Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc, Conm'n, supra note 103.
Quong Ham Wah appears to have been a California enterprise, although its exact character
does not appear. See Record, Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note
104, at 41. Alaska Packers was a California corporation qualified to do business in Alaska,
having its principal office in San Francisco. Id. at 63. In the remainder of this paper we
shall proceed on the assumption that the defendant in both cases had the ctaracterlstics
of Alaska Packers, ie., was a California corporation licensed to do business in Alaska.
Cf. note 104 supra.
115. A. F. Estabrook Go. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 117 'Cal. 767, 769, 177 Pac. 848
(1918).
116. In support of this position the court relied on Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
117. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Conm'n, supra note 103, at 32, 192 Pac.
at 1024.
118. In the instant case, the Compensation Act does not give the commission juris-
diction over controversies arising out of injuries sustained abroad by workinen
who are not residents of California. It is clear, therefore, that a nonresident
would have no standing before the commission or before any court, to make a claim
1352 [Vol. 69.1323
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
of the section, and held instead that the privileges-and-immunities clause uwas
self-executing and by its own force operated to extend the benefits of the stat-
ute to citizens of other states, leaving intact its provisions as to residents.,,
We 'have no quarrel with this holding, and therefore resist the temptation to
discuss its interesting jurisprudential implications. While the usual consequence
of unconstitutionality is nullity, in many cases of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion it is perfectly reasonable to treat the statute as remaining in effect with
its benefits extended to the disfavored class.'20 Although the operation of the
privileges-and-immunities clause as invalidating a statute or extending its
benefits to nonresidents would seem to be a -ederal question of some impor-
tance if it is open to reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court dismissed the em-
ployer's appeal, which complained only of the state court's resolution of this
question, as frivolous. 2 1
Of a certainty, the right of an employee to recover from 'his employer com-
pensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment as a result of
accident, or his own negligence, or the negligence of a fellow servant is not a
right which has "at aU times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and -sovereign."' To the credit of all concerned, however, no one suggested
that therefore the privileges-and-immunities clause uwas inapplicable. The ques-
under the act. And, not having jurisdiction over his injury, neither the commission
nor the courts could entertain or adjudicate his claim for compensation nor the
constitutional question involved.
Id. at 32-33, 192 Pac. at 1024. Whatever else may be said of this reasoning, it is strangely
at odds with the court's holding that the effect of the privilges-and-immunities clause
was to extend -the benefits of the act to nonresidents injured abroad-i.., to enlarge the
"jurisdiction" of the commission to cover such cases.
119. The earlier opinion is reproduced in Record, supra note 104, at 15.
120. The authorities are collected in the Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 104,
at 24. Principal reliance was placed upon Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 Pac. 424
(1903). But cf. note 241 infra.
121. The disposition of the appeal is understandable only if one recalls the peculiar
circumstances in which the constitutional question was raised. The state court's decision
sustained the employer's contention that the act violated the privileges-and-immunities
clause; yet the employer was aggrieved because the award was reinstated by virtue of
the holding that the effect of violation was not nullity but extension of the act's coverage.
While the Supreme Court had recently been given jurisdiction to review state court de-
cisions in favor of rights asserted under the Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958), it prob-
ably had difficulty visualizing the employer as one having standing to complain of the
state court's decision with respect to the privileges-and-immunities clause. If the employer
was considered as having standing, as in Buchanan v. Warley, supra note 116, to challenge
the statute under the due-process clause, the appeal must be construed as asserting that
the statute was void for discrimination in spite of the California court's holding that it
must be read as applying to citizens and noncitizens alike. Hence the Court regarded the
appeal as a complaint that the state court had misconstrued the statute, and held that it
had no jurisdiction of the appeal. 255 U.S. at 448-49.
122. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (No. 3230) (CC.E.D. Pa. 1823);
see text at note 37 supra.
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tion was whether the classification on the basis of residence was 'reasonable.
The Commission argued that it was: the legislature entertained no feelings of
hostility toward nonresidents, but simply sought -to refrain from attempting to
regulate matters not within its legitimate sphere of concern. The Commission's
-brief would -have done credit to Brandeis -himself although, as is not surprising
in view of the date, its pragmatic approach -is not unmixed with conceptualism.
In -the following two paragraphs we condense and paraphrase, with occasional
direct quotations, the portion dealing with the reasonableness of the classifi-
cation :123
"Workmen's compensation acts are economic and sociological in character
rather than juridical, and are to be construed so as to fulfill their purposes."' 2 4
A principal purpose of workmen's compensation is to protect the community
against the direct and indirect consequences of poverty to the extent that it
may 'be caused 'by industrial injuries. Industrial injuries are one of the prin-
cipal sources of poverty. Poverty is more than a personal misfortune; it is a
social evil as well, against which the state is entitled -to protect itself. The direct
consequences of poverty, produced in part by industrial injury, are that the
workman or his family, or 'both, -became dependent upon friends, relatives,
public institutions, .or charity. The indirect consequences include lower family
morale, child labor, and increased crime, prostitution, alcoholism, and delin-
quency. The state 'has an interest in compensating for extraterritorial injuries
when the victim or -his dependents are likely to 'be within the state during the
period of adversity. Thus, when the victim is a resident of the state, Califor-
nia's interest in securing compensation is as great as when the injury occurs
in the state; the place of injury -is immaterial. On the other 'hand, California
has (no interest in securing compensation for -nonresidents injured abroad. The
New Yorker, injured while at work in Alaska, will usually return to 'his 'home
in New York rather than come to California; his dependents are likely to be
in New York. "Certainly there is no presumption that residents of New York
or any other state, injured in Alaska, will affect -the interests of 'California."12 3
It is no part of the object of the act that ,California should protect New York
or its citizens against the possibility that injuries in Alaska to New Yorkers
will burden the people of New York. It would, in fact, 'be an invasion of -the
sovereignty of New York thus "to officiously intermeddle" in the public affairs
of New York.1 26 Alaska may legislate on such matters, and so may New
123. Brief for Defendant in Error, pp. 8-14, 44-57, Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Comm'n, 255 US. 455 (1.921). Reference is to the brief in the Supreme Court of
the United States rather than that in the state court because of its more general accessi-
bility.
124. Id. at 8. This statement, as dated as a World War I photograph, is in its own
negative way highly instructive. 'Once we come to realize that not only modern Social
legislation but also the bulk of the common 'law .is "economic and sociological in character,"
and not merely "juridical," territorial limitations on legislative jurisdiction will yield
to considerations of policy and governmental interest generally, as they have yielded
in workmen's compensation.
125. Id. at 50.
126. Id. at 57.
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York; but it is neither necessary nor reasonable for California to legislate
concerning the employment of New Yorkers in Alaska. Surely a classification
is reasonable if it does no more than confine the application of California's
policy to those situations in which California has a reasonable basis for insist-
ing on the application 9 f its policy.
Moreover, the classification is reasonable because it does no more than con-
fine the act to cases within ,California's legislative jurisdiction. If California
were to attempt to apply the act to citizens of other states injured abroad this
would be a denial of due process. "If the power of a state to give e.\traterri-
torial force to its workmen's compensation act is based upon its police power
to protect its own citizens and welfare, then such power is also limited by the
police power and cannot be extended beyond it, to cases where its citizens and
welfare are in no way affected."'2 7 It "stands to reason'12 that, if a state is
precluded by other provisions of the Constitution from applying its laws to
persons and events outside the scope of its legitimate concern, a citizen of an-
other state may not complain that he is deprived of any right secured to him
by article IV, section 2. The compensation act is not merely a regulation of
contracts but of the incidents of a status; jurisdiction over the status of master
and servant is conferred by the residence of the parties at the time of the in-
jury. Power to give extraterritorial force to the act is limited to protection of
California residents abroad. Since California could not give nonresidents the
benefits of such protection, the privileges-and-immunities clause does not re-
quire California to "do the impossible."'' 9
These arguments impressed the Supreme Court of California not at all. First
of all, the court construed the word "resident" to mean "citizen," because it
assumed that a person injured outside the state in the course of his employ-
ment could not be a resident at that time. The assumption is obviously fal-
lacious, but since we have concluded that nothing should turn upon whether
the statute is couched in terms of citizenship or residence, 'we need not labor
the point. Recognizing that the real issue was the reasonableness of the classi-
fication, the court first rejected the contention that, on conceptual grounds,
California 'had no legislative jurisdiction to cover nonresidents injured abroad.
The act neither regulated a status nor imposed liability as for a tort; if it pur-
ported to do either, the court would agree with counsel that California lacked
jurisdiction. But the act was a regulation of contracts; at least, the liability
it imposed might be -termed one quasi exv con tractu;130 and, since the contract
of employment was made in California, California had jurisdiction to regulate
it. Since it had the power to impose liability for the benefit of citizens of other
states as well as for its own, its failure to do so was a denial of the privileges
and immunities of citizenship; the suggested basis for ,the classification had
failed.
127. Id. at 50.
128. Id. at 46.
129. Id. at 53.
130. 184 Cal. at 36, 192 Pac- at 1025.
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With respect to the pragmatic argument that ,California had no interest in
applying its policy in such a case, and that the classification was therefore
reasonable, the court said:
[The effect of the privileges-and-immunities clause] is not limited to
those cases where its operation will not interfere with the internal policy
of the state or with considerations which appear to affect the general wel-
fare. Its mandate is absolute .... Respondents make the contention that
-the court should uphold the right of the state to require compulsory com-
pensation for its citizens alone, inasmuch as it is only citizens or their
families who are likely to 'become a public charge upon the state as a
result of injuries sustained abroad. The argument expresses a very excel-
lent reason for requiring compulsory compensation for citizens, but it
expresses -no reason at all for denying the same right to citizens of other
states.... In none of these cases was the rule sanctioned that a privilege
could be granted to a citizen of one state and denied to citizens of other
states, for the reason that public policy did not require that the privilege
be extended to the latter class of persons. Such a rule would be manifestly
unsound, and altogether dn conflict with the constitutional provision here
in question. No consideration of public policy -requires that citizens of
sister states be excluded from -the benefits of the act here under considera-
tion. The -fact that considerations of public policy do not affirmatively
require the extension of the benefits in question to citizens of sister states
as strongly as they require their extension to citizens of this state fur-
nishes absolutely no sound reason for the exclusion of the former, and
affords no reasonable -basis for the discrimination.' 3'
Thus the issue was sharply drawn as to whether the limits of governmental
interest constitute a reasonable basis for classification, and as to the extent to
which the due-process and full-faith-and-credit clauses limit the privileges-and-
immunities clause, and vice versa. Before we address ourselves to the court's
solution of the problem, -however, it is necessary to refer briefly to the rather
peculiar development culminating in the Alaska. Packers case.
The injured employee in Alaska Packers was neither a resident of 'Califor-
nia -nor a citizen of another state; he was a nonresident alien. The decision in
Quong Ham Wahhad the effect of extending the protection of the statute to
citizens of other states; it did not extend that protection to aliens injured
abroad; nor did any intervening legislative or judicial development require
such an extension of the act. Yet in Alaska Packers the California Supreme
Court remarked that the condition of residence had 'been "nullified" by Quong
Ham Wah,182 and proceeded to affirm an award to the alien employee.188 An
interesting aspect of this development is that 'California -had never asserted an
interest in covering -foreign injuries to aliens, unless such an assertion can be
131. 184 Cal. at 37-38, 192 Pac. at 1026.
132. .1 Cal. 2d 250, 255, 34 P.2d 716, 719 (1934).
133. The court should have known better than to make this mistake twice. On a
previous occasion it had been trapped into assuming that aliens were within the protection
of the privileges-and-immunities clause and had rather testily confessed error. Estate of
Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534-35, 73 Pac. 424, 425-26 (1903).
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inferred from this probably inadvertent interpretation of the judicial decision
which said that California must cover such injuries to citizens of other states
whether it had an interest in doing so or not. Yet the Supreme Court treated
the decision as an affirmation of the policy of the state and of the state's in-
terest in application of the policy to the case at bar. It is also significant that
the Court found that there was a reasonable basis for applying the policy-in
the special circumstances of the case. Since the injured employee was to be
returned to California within a short time, California's interest in guarding
against the effects of his destitution upon the community was substantially
the same as it would have been if the injury had occurred within the state.
The .result in Alaska Packers would not, of course, have been different if the
employee had been a citizen of another state. If California had an interest in
protecting aliens injured abroad, a fortiori it would have had an interest in pro-
tecting citizens of other states injured in the same circumstances-i.e, circum-
stances making it likely that the victim would become a burden to California
if not compensated. Equally, we believe that if the circumstances had been dif-
ferent-i.e., if there -had not been Teason to anticipate a burden on California-
the Court would have held the application of the California act to aliens injured
in Alaska a denial of due process or of full faith and credit, and that this result
would not have been altered if the employee had been a citizen of another state
instead of an alien. It is true that, since the privileges-and-immunities clause
does not extend to aliens, the Court is not confronted, -in a case involving an
alien employee, with the delicate problem of the interplay between that clause
and other -provisions of the Constitution; and it is conceivable that in a case
involving a citizen of another state, absent circumstances indicating a probable
burden on California, the Court might sustain the otherwise improper appli-
cation of California .law by reference to the privileges-and-immunities clause.
We consider this possibility most unlikely, however; and in the ensuing discus-
sion we shall speak of Alaska Packers as if the injured employee had been a
citizen of another state, assuming that the inferences to be drawn from the de-
cision are tenable in either case.
Returning to Qicong Hawn Walt, we may observe at the outset that the court
was clearly wrong in holding that California could legitimately apply its law
simply because the contract was made in the state; and this proposition is in-
dependent of any disputation as to whether the subject of regulation should be
characterized as contract, quasi-contract, tort, or status. Under the Constitu-
tion, the power of a state to apply its law in conflicts situations depends not on
such formalistic and adventitious "contacts," but upon whether the state has a
legitimate interest in the application of its policy. In New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Head,'3 4 which unambiguously involved contract, the Supreme Court de-
nounced as a denial of due process the application of Missouri law to a contract
of insurancebetween a nonresident and a foreign corporation, although the con-
tract was entered into within the state. A previous decision upholding the
134. 234 U.S. 149 (1914); see Currie, supra note 107, at 38.
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application of the same Missouri law in similar circumstances 185 was distin-
guished on the ground that it concerned insurance on the life of a resident of
Missouri. 36
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the application of 'California law
to compensate a citizen of another state injured abroad would ,be a denial of
due process, or a refusal of full faith and credit to the laws of Alaska. In Quong
Ham Wah the defendant employer was a California enterprise ;187 in Head the
defendant insurance company was a New York corporation licensed to do
business in Missouri. It is possible that, so far as due process and full faith and
credit are concerned, a state may impose upon its own residents and its own
corporations obligations which it would not be justified in imposing on non-
residents and foreign corporations.1 38 This important possibility will 'be con-
sidered in due course. We mention it here to avoid any implication that the
Head case necessarily invalidates the broad conception of Quong Ham Wah as
to the applicability of the 'California compensation act.
At this point matters will be clarified if we state a firm position on one prin-
ciple: if it is established that a state, by applying its law, will violate the due-
process clause or 'the full-faith-and-credit clause, its failure so to apply its law
cannot be a violation of the privileges-and-immunities clause. This is surely a
noncontroversial statement. It may be conceded that one might with equal
logic, as an abstract matter, state the proposition conversely: if a state must, 'by
virtue of the privileges-and-immunities clause, apply its law for the 'benefit of
citizens of other states, 'that application cannot violate 'the due-process clause
or the full-faith-and-credit clause. But the operation of the due-process and
full-fath-and-credit clauses is much more clearly defined than that of .the privi-
leges-and-immunities clause; if we are to have a reasonably ascertainable base-
line for the discussion, this is the preferable way to proceed.
It is clear that in the Head case the Supreme Court entertained no appre-
hension that withholding the benefits of Missouri law from nonresidents pur-
suant to the command of the due-process clause would entail any unconstitu-
tional discrimination. It is also clear -that the problem was called to the atten-
tion of -the Court. The Missouri Supreme Court had emphasized the legisla-
ture's altruistic purpose to extend the benefit of the law to "all persons whether
citizens, inhabitants, transients, visitors or sojourners,"1 0 and counsel for the
plaintiff had argued in ithe Supreme Court the point of unconstitutional dis-
135. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900).
136. 234 U.S. at 162.
137. See note 114 supra. The facts of Quong Ham Wah do not present a constitutiotl
problem. The problem was presented by the facts of a hypothetical case posed by the
court: a case in which a citizen of another state, hired in California, is injured in Alaska,
It is this hypothetical case to which the comment in this part of the text is addressed.
138. In the Head case the Court rejected the argument that application of Missouri's
nonforfeiture statute to contracts made with nonresidents could be sustained on the
basis of the state's power to condition the right of the foreign corporation to do business
in the state. 234 U.S. at 161, 163-64.
139. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 241 Mo. 403, 416, 147 S.W. 827, 831 (1912).
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crimination, though without specifically invoking article IV.140 The Court did
not deem ,the argument worthy of notice.141
The obvious need not be elaborated. The constitutional limits of a state's
power constitute a reasonable basis for classification. It has previously been
suggested that, in general, a state passes these limits when it applies its law to
a situation in which it has no legitimate interest in the furtherance of its legal
policies."' If that proposition were unqualifiedly true our principal problem
would'be solved: the limits of governmental interest are also a reasonable basis
for classification. -California would not be required to extend the benefits of its
compensation law -to citizens of other states injured abroad, where there are no
special circumstances indicating that the injured employee may become a bur-
den, because California would have no power thus to extend the applicability of
the ,law. A neat dichotomy is suggested: where governmental interests end,
there ends also the obligation to afford equal treatment to citizens of other
states; but within -the area of governmental interest equal treatment must be
afforded. Neat dichotomies are rare, -however, in the troublesome areas of con-
stitutional law, and are to be viewed with distrust.143 There are two obstacles
to such a solution here: (1) the proposition that a state violates the due-
process clause or the full-faith-and-credit clause when it applies its law to a
situation in which it 'has no interest in the application of its legal policy can-
not be assumed, even by its advocates, to be true beyond possibility of quali-
fication; and (2) it is not safe to assume that the constitutional restraints on
discrimination contained in the privileges-and-immunities and equal-protection
clauses require a state to exercise the full range of its power. 44
The specific problem that gives rise to doubts on the first score may be illus-
trated by reference to Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel.14 5 A Minnesota statute pro-
vided that the unlawful sale of liquor should render the seller liable to any per-
140. 234 U.S. at 152.
141.' In Quong Ham Wah the Commission relied primarily on Broivn-Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563 (1910), holding that a license tax could not be attacked
as discriminatory on the ground that it did not extend to subjects beyond the taxing
power of the state. Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 104, at 45-46.
142. See text at note 109 supra.
143. Compare the problem of whether there can be a judgment which is consistent
with due process and yet not entitled to full faith and credit. See Currie, Full Faith
and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 620, 666-67 (1954).
144. As we have seen, neither the California legislature nor the California courts
had ever asserted an interest in compensating aliens, or citizens of other states, injured
abroad. See text following note 133 Supra. California did not foresee the adverse effect
upon the local community of such injuries in the "special circumstances" of seasonal
employment of migratory laborers. Its failure to do so, although its interest in com-
pensating the employee in such circumstances was later recognized, was surely not a
denial of equal protection of the lawxs (as the California court seemed to suggest in hold-
ing that the state had jurisdiction to regulate all contracts entered into within its borders,
see tex-t at note 130 supra) since a state has never been required to deal exhaustively
with the problem under consideration. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929).
145. 249 Minn. 376, 82 NAV.2d 365 (1957).
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son injured -by the intoxication of the consumer. A Minnesota enterprise sold
liquor in violation of law to one who, in consequence of -his intoxication, over-
turned a car in which a resident of Minnesota was a passenger. The accident
occurred in Wisconsin, which had -no such statute. Very sensibly, the Minne-
sota court applied its own law and imposed liability, rejecting -the rule that the
law of the place of the wrong determines liability in tort.140 The court em-
phasized that all parties were residents of Minnesota, and referred to "the in-
terest of Minnesota"1 47 in providing a remedy: "The consequential harm to
plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen, accordingly should be compensated for under
[the statute] which furnishes him a remedy against defendant for its wrongful
acts.... [O] ur determination... will better afford Minnesota citizens the pro-
tection which the Civil Damage Act -intended for them. ' '148
Suppose, now, that in a similar case the victim is a citizen of Wisconsin, run
down on the streets of that state by a driver 'who has become intoxicated in a
Minnesota bar. In adopting the Civil Damage Act, the Minnesota legislature
weighed the interests of one group of its citizens (the liquor dealers) against
the interests of another (the victims of the liquor trade), and decided that the
former should 'be subordinated to the latter. Minnesota's short-term selfish in-
terests would not 'be served 'by penalizing its liquor dealers for the benefit of
citizens of other states, injured in other states. But the Minnesota courts might
reason: Why should we be so selfish and provincial? The legislature 'has de-
cided that our liquor industry should 'bear its social costs. The industry can
adjust itself to that responsibility -by insurance or otherwise. The increased cost
attributable to liability for injuries -to nonresidents outside the state would be
moderate. Why should we not adhere to the principle that the industry should
bear its social costs, irrespective of where the injury occurs and who the victim
is?
Would a decision in favor of the Wisconsin citizen, based on such reasoning,
be a denial of due process of law ? It is difficult to believe that any court would
so 'hold. It is true that Minnesota has no "interest" in the application of its law
in the usual sense: i.e., this is not a situation in which the application of Minne-
sota law is required for effectuation of the legislative policy, expressed in the
146. Rz.TATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
147. 249 Minn. at 380, 82 N.W.2d at 368.
148. Id. at 380-81, 382, 82 N.W.2d at 368-69. The court also spoke of Minnesota's
interest in "admonishing" the local dealer who had violated its statutes, and cited Gordon
v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), to emphasize the state's interest in deterring
wrongful conduct within its borders. Without in any way doubting the legitimacy of
such an interest, we 'should like to leave it out of consideration for present purposes,
The case is referred to merely for purposes of illustration; a hypothetical case would
serve nearly as well; and the illustrative case for the purpose in hand should be one
in which such an interest is not asserted. Such a hypothetical case is not unrealistic.
The Illinois Dramshop Act, ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1957), imposes absolute
liability on 'the seller of intoxicants, notwithstanding the legality of the sale. Such a
statute hardly expresses a policy of regulating conduct within the state. But the Illinois
courts hold that it does not apply to injuries suffered outside the state. Eldridge v. Don
Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ili. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
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Civil Damage Act, which is one for the protection of Minnesota people. The
California Industrial Accident Commission's argument, that the imposition
of liability is justified by the police power to safeguard local interests, and that
where local interests end the power also ends,140 seems unduly restrictive. It is
not lightly to be assumed -that the Constitution prohibits a state from adopting
a humane and altruistic policy. Moreover, such a policy might well serve the
selfish interests of the state if those interests are evaluated from a long-range
point of view. In general, withholding the benefits of local laws from citizens
of other states will invite retaliation, to the detriment of local citizens; retalia-
tion will lead to reciprocity-a cumbersome device for ameliorating the effects
of provincialism. Surely a state, especially a member of a federal union, might
reasonably decide to avoid this painful cycle and begin by adopting a cosmo-
politan attitude, in the hope, if not the confidence, that other states will do the
same.
A state may be said, then, to have an "interest" in the application of its law
in such a situation; but this interest is quite different from that which a state
has in applying its law to a situation in which application is required for effec-
tuation of the immediate policy of the law in question. In order to distinguish
between them we shall refer to the one here under discussion as an "altruistic
interest," the unqualified term "interest" being understood to mean that there
is a reasonable basis for the application of the law in order to effectuate the
specific policy that it embodies. The proposition that a state violates the due-
process clause when it applies its law in a situation in which it has no interest
in doing so-i.e., when such application is not reasonably necessary for effec-
tuation of the specific policy embodied in the law-must be qualified: an "al-
-truistic interest" in the application of-the law may .be an adequate defense
against attack based on the due-process clause.
The next question is whether, if Minnesota may apply its Civil Damage Act
for the benefit of a citizen of Wisconsin injured in Wisconsin, it must do so by
reason of the .privileges-and-immunities clause. A similar question may be
asked concerning application of the California workmen's compensation act to
citizens of other states injured outside California. On the one hand, there is
force in the argument of the California commission, that a state may reason-
ably draw the line of classification where its interests end. On the other hand,
there is persuasiveness in the argument that the very purpose of the federal
union, and specifically of the privileges-and-immunities clause, was to avoid the
"painful cycle" of provincialism, retaliation, and reciprocity to which such
classifications may lead, and that each state must therefore extend to citizens of
other states the benefits that it provides for its own. It is difficult to choose be-
tween these arguments as they stand. Both are essentially assertions, and both
are -rather general. It may be that, upon closer examination of the problem in
its various manifestations, we shall find that there are additional factors to be
taken into account; that a solution appropriate to one type of situation is in-
149. See text at note 127 .-upra.
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appropriate to another; and that the truth lies somewhere between the ex-
tremes that 'have been suggested.
IV. ALTRUism VERSUS 'OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLING
A state court -has described the California court's ruling on the privileges-
and-immunities clause in Quong Ham Wah as obiter dictum ;10 'but, however
gratuitously, the decision did have the effect of extending the coverage of the
act. One state court has endorsed the reasoning of the case. Like the California
court, it did so in a context in which the issue of discrimination was not square-
ly presented ;151 unlike the California court, it did not extend the act to cover
nonresident employees, 'but construed it as not covering residents injured else-
where, thus avoiding a square holding on the constitutional question. The em-
ployer was an Indiana corporation; the employee was a "freehold resident" of
Indiana, temporarily living in Illinois ; the contract of employment was regarded
as having been made outside Indiana, and was to be performed in Arkansas,
where injury and death occurred. The Indiana court reversed an award to the
widow and son, holding that since the contract was neither made nor to be per-
formed in Indiana the compensation act of the lorum was inapplicable, not-
withstanding that the employee was a resident and 'the employer a domestic
corporation:
To give a controlling influence to the fact that the employee was a resident
of this state.. . so as to allow compensation in this case, when compen-
sation would 'be denied if such employee had been a resident of Illinois,
would be granting rights and privileges to a citizen of this state which
would not, under the same facts, be granted citizens of other states.102
The California count's 'ruling was also approved by Paxton Blair in a well-
known article;153 and this approval is noteworthy because in general Blair
adopted a restrictive view of the privileges-and-immunities clause, -his thesis
being that there was no constitutional obstacle to increased employment of the
doctrine of 'forum non conveniens. His reasons for approving the decision,
however, are not persuasive; ,they are somewhat unclear, and in -the end amount
150. Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S.C. 363, 374, 25 S.E.2d 235,
239 (1942).
151. Bement Oil Corp. v. Cubbison, 84 Ind. App. 22, 149 N.E. 919 (1925). Massa-
chusetts also appears to have accepted the Quong Hans Wah reasoning, though largely
in suport of its construction of the local act. In Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E.
693 (1913), the act was held inapplicable to extraterritorial injuries. A 1927 amendment,
Mass. Stat. ch: 309, § 3 (1927), provided for compensation for such injuries without
limiting coverage to resident emiiployees. In McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 219, 221,
174 N.E. 338, 339-40 (1931), the court upheld the act as amended against attack based
on the full-faith-and-credit clause, twice citing Quong Hanm Wah, though without dis-
cussing the privileges-and-immunities problem. The injured employee was a resident
of Massachusetts.
152. 84 Ind. App. at 25, 149 N.E. at 920.
153. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniets in Anglo-American Law, 29
CoLum. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (1929).
1362 [Vol. 69:1323
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
to an assertion that a state has jurisdiction to apply its compensation act when-
ever the contract is made in the state, and that this jurisdiction must be exer-
cised without distinction between residents and nonresidents.' 5 '
In other states the courts have rejected the ruling of Quong Ham Wah.
In Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Gosin 15 the employee was a resident
of Maryland; the employer wmas a New Jersey corporation '5 0 having a Mary-
land office; the contract was made in Delaware; and the injury occurred in
Delaware. The Maryland act provided for payment of compensation to all em-
ployees of a certain class "who are citizens or residents of this State, employed
by a person, firm or corporation having a place of business within this State,
whether the injury for which compensation is asked was sustained within this
State or elsewhere."'157 The Maryland court construed the act as not extend-
ing to -the case at bar. Such a construction would be "illogical and impossible,"
because "the State would have been powerless to enforce any such provi-
sions." 158 The act extended to injuries to residents abroad only if the contract
of employment was made in Maryland.'"0 In a portion of the opinion preceding
the announcement of this construction the court had addressed itself to a chal-
lenge based on -the privileges-and-immunities clause; its decision that that
clause did not prevent application of the act to residents injured abroad must
be understood as referring to the act as construed, i.e., as requiring also that
the contract of employment be made in the state. The reasons for rejecting the
Quong Ham Wah position were: (1) that the distinction drawn was in terms
of residence rather than citizenship; and (2) that the state had no power to
apply its law to nonresidents injured abroad (even, apparently, though the con-
tract was made in the state).
A Michigan statute similar to that of California was construed as not restrict-
ing coverage of out-of-state injuries to resident employees; a provision appar-
ently limiting jurisdiction of the commission to cases involving residents was
held inoperative because it conflicted with other sections of the acLGcO The
court did not, therefore, reach the question whether coverage for nonresidents
was required by the privileges-and-immunities clause. Later, when the act had
been amended to make its coverage compulsory rather than optional, the same
provision was construed as depriving the commission of jurisdiction to make
an award to a nonresident employee where the contract of employment was
made in Texas and the injury occurred in Tennessee.' 0 ' Although the court
154. Ibid. The Head case, supra note 134, is at war with this conception.
155. 163 Md. 74, 160 AtL 804 (1932).
156. MOODY'S INDUSTmrAL MANUAL 2271 (1959).
157. MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 21(44) (1957). The statute vras identical at the
time of the decision.
158. 163 Aid. at 83, 160 At. at 809.
159. Ibid. Note that on this construction the similarity betveen the Maryland act
and the California act is increased.
160. Roberts v. I.X.L. Glass Corp., 259 Mich. 644, 244 N.W. 188 (1932).
161. Daniels v. Trailer Transport Co., 3277 Mich. 525, 42 N.W.2d 828 (1950). The
employer's "home office" was in Michigan. Roberts v. I.X.L Glass Corp., .upra note 157,
was not cited.
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was presumably aware that such a construction raised a problem of unconsti-
tutional discrimination,""2 it did not discuss the problem. It is not clear whether
the later case overrules the earlier, so that compensation would now be denied
a nonresident injured abroad even though his contract was made in Michigan.
If it does, the inference is that the count 'has rejected the Quong Ham Wah
solution of the discrimination problem.
The question was squarely presented for the first time in a North Carolina
case. The North Carolina statute provided:
Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere
than in this State which would entitle him or his dependents to compensa-
tion if it had happened in this State, the employee or his dependents shall
be entitled -to compensation, if the contract of employment was made in
this State, if the employer's place of business -is in this State, and if the
residence of the employee is in this State; provided, his contract of employ-
ment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the State .... 10a
The injury occurred in South Carolina. The contract was made in North
Carolina; the plaintiff was a citizen and resident of South ,Carolina. The con-
tract called for work in both states.164 The court's rejection of the argument
that to withhold compensation would violate the privileges-and-immunities
clause is interesting. Without relying on the formal distinction between resi-
dence and citizenship, -the court said:
The apparent difficulty which the State might be under in extra-territo-
rial extension of its laws, affecting the rights of residents of other states,
and uncertainty as to the extent to which this State may be able to protect
its own citizens and industries by giving its laws and the orders of the
Industrial, Commission such extra-territorial effect is sufficient ground to
sustain the jurisdictional classification that -the employee be a resident of
this State, and -this involves no unconditional [unconstitutional?] discrim-
ination.'6 5
According to this approach, classification may reasonably 'be based not only on
the limits of jurisdiction 'but on uncertainty regarding the demarcation of those
limits.
South Carolina, with an identical statute, reached the same -result in an iden-
tical fact situation. °6  The opinion draws upon all the prior decisions rejecting
Quong Ham Wah, emphasizing the distinction between residence and citizen-
ship. Its most significant passages assert the -propriety of limiting the benefits
of the statute to cases in which the state has an interest in its application:
162. Quong Ham Wah had been cited in Roberts v. I.X.L. Glass Corp., supra note
160, at 653, 244 N.W. at 192.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-36 (1955). The text of the statute has not been
changed since the decision.
164. The character of the employer does not appear, but it did have a place of
business in North Carolina.
165. Reaves v. Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co., 216 N.C. 462, 465-66, 5 S.E.2d 305, 307
(1939).
166. Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S.C. 363, 25 S.E.2d 235 (1942).
Here it is clear that the employer was a domestic corporation.
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To great extent the whole scheme of workmen's compensation is to
place the economic burden of industrial accidents upon industry rather
than .upon the workers and their dependents, and as to the latter thereby
rendered indigent, -upon the State .... This raisn d'ctrc does not usually
exist as to nonresidents of the State .... [T]he exclusion is reasonable in
view of the principal purpose of the law, above alluded to, and also of the
difficulties of its administration in the case of "foreign" accidents, with
claimants and witnesses beyond the jurisdiction, etc.6T
Several states, construing compensation acts not in terms applicable to extra-
territorial injuries, have held that such injuries are compensable when the in-
jured employee is a resident.0 8 The emphasis upon the policy and interest of
the state ' 6 9 and the lack of any discussion of the discrimination problem sug-
gest that the courts in these states have assumed that the benefits of such laws
may constitutionally be withheld from those employees whom the state has no
interest in protecting170
At -this point we are prepared to state another firm position, relating in the
first instance to the due-process and full-faith-and-credit clauses, and by way
of corollary to the privileges-and-immunities clause. In the pursuit of its altru-
167. Id. at 384, 25 S.E2d at 243. As the North Carolina court had noted earlier,
Reaves v. Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co., mspra note 165, at 465, 5 S.E2d at 307, a work-
men's compensation act also operates to protect local industry against liability of the
magnitude envisioned by the common law. But if injury to the nonresident employee
had occurred in a state not having a compensation act, the North and South Carolina
acts would not have provided a defense to a common-law action for damages. By not
extending their acts to foreign injuries to nonresidents, these states refrained not only
from asserting a nonexistent interest in the employee, but also from asserting a very
tangible interest in protecting local industry. If the interest in limiting the liability
of the employer were asserted, extension of the benefits of the act to the nonresident employee
would necessarily follow (within the framework of the workmen's compensation scheme).
It would be difficult to dispute the "jurisdiction" of the employer's state to produce such a
result. Thus South Carolina was not necessarily drawing the line of classification where her
jurisdiction to protect the employee ended, but where her interest in protecting him ended;
and, in the process, the legislature circumscribed its policy of limiting the liability of local
enterprise. In this light, there was surely no hostile purpose to discriminate against non-
residents. This view is not completely realistic in the context of almost universal work-
men's compensation; but see text at note 177 infra.
168. E.g., State ex rel. Morgan v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 300 P.2d 954
(1956); Selser v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., 146 So. 690 (La. App. 1933).
169. Notably in State ex tel. Morgan v. Industrial Ace. Bd., supra note 168, at 286,
300 P2d at 962.
170. The reasoning of Qwung Ham Wal has also been rejected in a different context.
North Dakota established an unsatisfied judgments fund, accumulated by a tax on motor
vehicle registrations. Only residents of the state were entitled to have their unsatisfied
judgments paid out of the fund. A citizen of Illinois, injured in North Dakota, attacked
the limitation as discriminatory. The court upheld the dassification on the ground that the
plaintiff was not a contributor to the fund (although a resident of North Dakota, not the
owner of a motor vehicle registered in the state, could presumably recover). The court
observed that it was unnecessary to decide the constitutional issue that would be presented
if -the nonresident applicant were a contributor to the fund. Benson v. Schneider, 68
N.W2d 665 (N.D. 1955).
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istic interests, a state must stop short of trenching upon the interests of other
states; therefore, the privileges-and-immunities clause does not require a state
to extend the benefits of its laws to nonresidents where the state has no interest
in so doing, and where so doing would interfere with the policy of a state hav-
ing a direct interest in the matter.
It is one thing for a state to 'be generous -to nonresidents at the expense of
its own residents and enterprises; it is quite another to be generous to non-
residents at the expense of other nonresidents, or even of residents, or local
enterprises, whose activities bring -them within the protection of another state's
policy. Thus -in Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel,1 71 if the injured plaintiff 'had been a
citizen of Wisconsin, Minnesota might constitutionally have held its own enter-
prise liable; ,but if the seller were a Wisconsin corporation doing business in
Minnesota, application of the Minnesota law to compensate a nonresident in-
jured outside the state might impair, without adequate justification, the interest
of Wisconsin in allowing its business enterprises to operate free of such lia-
bility.17 2
By -these standards, the decision in Quong Ham Wah was erroneous. 117 If a
citizen of New York is 'hired in California to work in Alaska, and is injured in
Alaska, in the absence of "special circumstances" indicating that he may be
returned to California, the application of California's compensation act will be
an intrusion into the affairs of New York or Alaska, or both. And this is so
although the employer, as in Quong Ham Wah, is a California corporation
qualified to do 'business in Alaska. Alaska ,has an interest in regulating the lia-
bility of foreign corporations doing business in the state for injuries to em-
ployees occurring there. New York has an interest in providing compensation
for ,its 'residents injured in Alaska. California has no comparable interest, At
most, California can assert an altruistic interest in extending the benefits of its
171. Discussed in text at note 145 supra.
172. A reminder is in order that we are here excluding from consideration Minnesota's
interest in penalizing unlawful conduct in the state, see note 148 supra,--an interest that
would fully justify the application of Minnesota law, cf. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp.
40 (D. Mass. 1949). Even so, we recognize that it is difficult to accept the statement
in the text. It is easier to make and accept the statement that the privileges-and- immunities
clause does not require Minnesota to apply its law in such a situation; and it is the
operation of that clause with which we are here primarily concerned. The question is
why the application of Minnesota law would not be required in such a case if it is required
when the defendant is a Minnesota resident or enterprise; and the answer appears to
be that in this case Minnesota not only has no interest in protecting the plaintiff but would,
or at least might, intrude upon the interest of another state by applying its law and policy.
The subject is further considered in the text at note 220 infra.
173. As always in discussing Quong Ham Wah, we encounter here difficulties of state-
ment In retrospect, after Alaska Packers, note 102, supra, we know that because
of the special circumstances of the hiring California had a specific interest in protecting
the nonresident injured in Alaska. But the holding in Quong Ham Wals was directed
broadly to the hypothetical case of a nonresident injured abroad, with no reference to
any special circumstances indicating that he was likely to become a burden to California.
It is the holding as applied to this hypothetical case that is regarded as erroneous.
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laws to nonresidents where the burden is borne by California enterprise; but
that interest must yield when it conflicts with a direct interest on the part of
another state.
In New Ytrk Life Ins. Co. v. Head 174 the defendant insurer was a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in Missouri, and the contract was made in
Missouri; yet Missouri's attempt to extend the benefits of its laws to the non-
resident insured was an interference with the interests of the state of incor-
poration, and so was properly stricken down. It follows, of course, that Mis-
souri was not required by the privileges-and-immunities clause to extend the
benefit of its laws to nonresidents in such a situation. Whether it would be
required to do so if the insurer were a domestic corporation, and if no other
state's interests were involved, is a question we do not attempt to answer at
this point.
It remains to be seen whether the application of the California compensation
act in the generalized Quong Ham Walt situation would in fact intrude upon
the interests of other states. So far as the state of the injured employee's resi-
dence (New York) is concerned, it is difficult too see how its interests could
be adversely affected by making an award to the employee, unless the award
were in an amount less than that provided for by the law of New York, and
had the effect of preventing further compensation under that law.'" But a
judgment refusing compensation on the merits, so as to bar the compensation
proceeding in New York, would be a rather serious interference with the in-
terest of that state. With respect to the state of injury (Alaska), its interests
would be affected adversely not only by a preclusive denial of compensation,
or an award dless than that provided by Alaska, but also by an award in excess
of -that provided for by Alaska law. Workmen's compensation laws in all the
states are basically similar, so that in many cases the degree of intrusion in the
latter case might be slight; yet relatively minor differences have led to hard-
fought litigation, 76 and major differences are sometimes encountered.117 The
California court, however, is hardly in position to decide whether its intrusions
upon the interests of Alaska are unimportant or not.178 Moreover, the Alaska
174. Discussed in text at note 134 .supra.
175. Compare Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), ildls In-
dustrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
176. ,See note 175 supra.
177. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); cf. Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272
(1959).
178. A facile way to make the point that California should not intrude would be to
emphasize the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the Alaska act. Such provisions have
been heavily emphasized by the Supreme Court not only in the cases involving compen-
sation awards, note 175 supra, but in the cases on due process and full faith and credit
to public acts, see Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cnm. L. Rnm.
9, 19-30 (1958). But we believe that such provisions are intended primarily to exclude
common-law remedies, and have been given undue importance in the conflicts situation;
moreover, the interest of the foreign state may exist, and if so is entitled to due respect,
even in the absence of a provision purporting to make the remedy exclusive.
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act may be interpreted 'by the courts of that state as localizing the cause of
action: i.e., as intended -to -have the effect of limiting the injured employee to
a proceeding in a tribunal of Alaska, and not elsewhere. 179 If that is so, al-
though the state of the employee's residence need not observe the limitation,
having an interest of its own in providing a forum, California should observe
it, having no comparable interest.118
These conclusions suggest a -further qualification of the governmental-inter-
est analysis. One of the prime theses of that method of approach to conflict-
of-laws problems is that no court, state or federal, is in position to "weigh"
and choose between truly conflicting interests of different states.181 It has pre-
viously 'been conceded that a state's basis for asserting an interest in the appli-
cation of its policy may be so attenuated as to justify its disregard for con-
stitutional purposes. 18 2 And it is clear that the courts of a state may properly
take into account the possibility of conflict with the interests of other states in
determining what domestic policy is and how far domestic interests extend. 18 3
Here we add that the "altruistic interest" of a state-its interest in extending
the benefits of its laws to all persons without distinction-must yield to the
specific interest of another state in effectuating the policy expressed in its law.
The "altruistic interest" is of a quite different order from the interest of a state
in effectuating the specific policies declared in its .laws; the subordination of
-the former -to the latter does not seem to us to involve the exercise of legis-
lative discretion in the same sense as does the choice between conflicting state
interests of a coordinate and specific character.
1 8 4
V. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST AS A BASIS FOR 'CLASSIFICATION
In one of the earliest of the Supreme Court's decisions under the privileges-
and-immunities clause, Conner v. Elliott,18 5 the Court held that community
179. Cf. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909).
180. See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv.
L. Rxv. 36, 76-82 (1959). It may be well to repeat that the discussion in the text is not
applicable to the actual fact situationdin Quong Ham Wah, where the plaintiff was a resident
of California, nor to that in Alaska Packers, where, though the employee was an alien,
he was to be returned to California. In those situations California had an interest in the
application of its law, and in providing a forum. The latter interest is emphasized by the
difficulties confronting the employee if his remedy were to seek compensation in Alaska.
Brief for Appellees, pp. 21, 26, 31-32, Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935).
181. Currie, supra note 178, at 77-84.
182. Id. at 45, n.156.
183. See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U.
CHI. L. R.Zv. 1, 65-75 (1959).
184. The question whether state policies relating to judicial administration should be
treated as belonging to an order inferior to that of "substantive" policies was considered
and answered in the negative in Currie, supra note 180, at 43.
185. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
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property rights were not "privileges of citizenship" within the protection of the
clause. Mrs. Conner, a native of Louisiana, was married in Mississippi to a
citizen of Mississippi, and the couple resided in ississippi for the duration
of the marriage. In the course of the marriage Mr. Conner acquired real estate
in Louisiana, and on his death the widow applied for distribution in accordance
with Louisiana's system of community property. Her application was refused
because the Louisiana code was specific as to the applicability of the communi-
ty property law to mixed cases: it applied only (1) where the marriage was
contracted in the state or (2) as to after-acquired property, where persons
married elsewhere became residents of Louisiana.
The Court's holding that the right, to be protected, must be one that "be-
long[s] to citizenship,"'1 6 and that ordinary legal rights such as those in issue
are not of that class, seems much impaired by Blake v. McClung. 8 7 But the
Court seems to have been attempting to say more than this. The Louisiana law
was regarded as a regulation of the incidents of contract:
And, in obedience to that principle of universal jurisprudence, which re-
quires a contract to be governed by the law of the place where it is made
and to be performed, the law of Louisiana undertakes to control these in-
cidents of a contract of marriage made within the State by persons domi-
ciled there; but leaves such contracts, made elsewhere, to be governed by
the laws of the places where they may be entered into. In this, there is no
departure from any sound principle, and there can be no just cause of
complaint' 8 8
The application of Louisiana's law to persons married elsewhere and coming
to Louisiana to live was upheld on the ground that the state thus properly
regulated the incidents of contracts performed within its borders:
The laws of Louisiana afix certain incidents to a contract of marriage
there made, or there wholly or partly executed, not because those who
enter into such contracts are citizens of the State, but because they there
make or perform the contract. And they refuse to affix these incidents to
such contracts, made and executed elsewhere, not because the married
persons are not citizens of Louisiana, but because their contract being
made and performed under the laws of some other State or country, it is
deemed proper not to interfere, by Louisiana laws, %ith the relations of
married persons out of that State.189
This reasoning has several interesting aspects. It suggests, for one thing,
that Louisiana was doing -no more than confining its regulation within the
limits of its jurisdiction; yet the situs of land within a state has always pro-
vided a comparatively safe peg on which to hang the applicability of the law
of the state, and traditional conflicts theory concedes jurisdiction--even, it
seems, exclusive jurisdiction-in matters of marital property to the state where
186. Id. at 593.
187. 172 U.S. 239 (1893).
188. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 593.
189. Id. at 594.
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the land is.' ° ° It is difficult to believe that in 1855 the Court would 'have denied
the jurisdiction of the state of the situs to determine the interests in land of
nonresidents and parties to foreign mariages. The decision probably cannot be
explained, therefore, on -the ground that Louisiana stopped only after exercis-
ing its power to the fullest. That being so, the Court's emphasis on the circum-
stance that Louisiana was drawing no invidious and hostile line between its
residents and residents of other states may suggest that a state does not violate
the privileges-and-immunities clause when it limits the application of its laws
to cases in which it 'believes it has an interest in applying its policy.
Community property law is a complex and ,recondite subject; it is not easy
to determine what governmental policy is expressed by such laws, nor the cir-
cumstances in which a state may reasonably assert an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy. 19 We shall not attempt any such determination offhand, in
a general paper such as this. Yet we may venture this suggestion: there was
no dichotomy comprising (a) married women who were residents (or citizens)
of Louisiana and (b) married women who were nonresidents of Louisiana.
The categories established were: (a) married women residing in Louisiana
(with respect only to property acquired during residence there), together with
all women married in Louisiana; and (b) all other married women. The dis-
tinction, therefore, was not one between residents and nonresidents as such;
community property rights were not generally conferred on resident married
women. The classification followed a different -line, and the question is whether
it was a reasonable one. We -have no way of knowing what the legislature's
actual reason was for drawing the line -in this way. Conceivably, however, it
may have wished to impose the rule of community property only in those
situations in which, in the judgment of the legislature, both parties were most
likely to be aware of its probable applicability, so that they would have the
maximum opportunity to avail themselves of the privilege of adopting a dif-
ferent rule for themselves by agreement. A Mississippi man marrying a Loui-
siana woman in Mississippi is not very likely to contemplate the problem of
community property, especially with respect to property which he does not
then own, but may acquire in the future, in Louisiana; still less is he likely
to think of -the matter when he acquires property in Louisiana years later. On
the other hand, when persons are married in a community property state, or
later move to one, it is more likely that they will be alerted to the problem
and make their adjustment to it. In this view, the decision does not support
the proposition that a classification coterminous with state interests is ipso
facto valid.
190. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 238 (1934). Moreover, the Court's assump-
tion that the state of contracting has unquestionable jurisdiction to regulate the incidents of
a contract is belied by the Head case, supra note 134.
191. Indeed, it may be questioned whether such laws embody governmental policy,
in the sense in which that concept is encountered in other laws, since the Louisiana statute
expressly permitted the parties to a Louisiana marriage to stipulate out of the community
system. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 592.
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In Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. 92 the Court upheld the Oregon statute
giving nonresident married women dower only in lands of which the husband
died seized, while giving residents dower in all lands of which the husband was
seized at any time during the marriage. The opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna
is confused and misleading.193 Without so much as citing Blake v. McCg,'0
he declared that "dower is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship, either
state or -federal .... ,"19 He next observed that a number of states had upheld
similar statutes. Dower was simply an incident of the marital contract or re-
lation; it was entirely subject to state regulation, and might .be given or with-
held altogether 'by the legislature. "[T]he legislature having this power to give
or withhold dower, it follows that it has the power to declare the manner in
which the dower right may be barred, or the grounds upon which it may be
forfeited, and, if so, it has the right to provide that it may be barred by the
wife's nonresidence in the state."190 And, as if to silence all disagreement:
"[T]he right of dower in real property is determined by the laws of the state
in which the property is situated."'197
All this is unsatisfactory, especially since it was addressed indiscriminately
to the points raised under the privileges-and-immunities clause of article IV,
the privileges-or-immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the
equal-protection clause. Obviously, the statement that the law of the situs
determines whether dower exists gives no answer to the question whether the
situs state has unconstitutionally discriminated in its provisions for dower. Just
as obviously, the power to withhold dower altogether does not justify granting
it to some and arbitrarily withholding it from others. Thus a provision exclud-
ing -resident widows ,from the privilege on grounds of race would almost cer-
tainly offend the equal-protection clause.
Actually, these divagations were quite unnecessary to the decision. There
was, as Mr. Justice McKenna noted twice in the course of his opinion, a per-
fectly sound basis for the classification. Especially in the western states, the
requirement that a nonresident wife, whose existence might not even be known
to the purchaser, join -in her husband's conveyances in order to bar dower, had
created great inconvenience in land transactions and great uncertainty as to
titles:
The cases Tecognize that the limitation of the dower right is to remove
an impediment to the transfer of real estate and to assure titles against
absent and probably unknown wives. And such is the purpose of the Ore-
gon statute, and the means of executing the purpose appropriate, and a
proper exercise of classification.'""
192. 258 U.S. 314 (1922).
193. Cf. Currie, mtPra note 143, at 648.
194. .172 U.S. 239 (1898), discussed in 'text at note 44 mspra.
195. 258 US. 314, 318.
196. Id. at 321.
197. Id. at 320, quoting from Thomas v. Woods, 173 Fed. 585, 593 (1909).
198. Id. at 319. The next sentence was, "It satisfies, therefore, the constitutional re-
quirement of the equal protection of the laws; and we proceed to the inquiry whether the
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If we may read into this opinion somewhat more than can realistically be at-
tributed to its author, it does not directly support the proposition that a classi-
fication is reasonable merely because it limits state policy to the extent of state
interests. We may assume that in general the policy embodied in provisions for
dower is to benefit the widow. If it consulted its own interests alone, there-
fore, Oregon might 'have restricted all dower privileges to residents. This it
did not do, but extended dower in lands of which -the ,husband died seized-
with respect to which there -was no such conveyancing problem-to residents
and nonresidents alike, including aliens. This circumstance serves to show that
the purpose of excluding nonresidents from dower in other lands was not in-
vidious and hostile; it serves also to show that the case is not authority for
the proposition that a line of classification drawn where state interests end is
reasonable. More was present ,here to justify the classification: the purpose of
Oregon to facilitate land transfer and secure the stability of titles.10 9
The same cannot be said -for similar statutes construed 'by the state courts
to mean that the required residence must exist at the time of the 'husband's
death rather than at the time of the conveyance. 2°° On that construction, the
purpose of the classification cannot 'be intelligibly explained as one to facilitate
land transfers and protect innocent purchasers. The Michigan Supreme Court
recognized, indeed, that only a construction referring residence to the time of
conveyance made sense, and -that the language -that the court construed as com-
pelling a different construction was used by mistake, or 'because of legislative
whimsy.2 0 1 Alternatively, it may be suggested that the -legislature limited the
benefits of its dower policy to those widows whom it had an interest in pro-
tecting-i.e., -those who were residents at the time of the husband's death. In
that view, these state court decisions, upholding the statutes against attacks
based on the privileges-and-immunities clause, may -be taken as supporting the
proposition that the limits of state interest, without more, are a reasonable
basis for classification. The decisions do not give adequate consideration to the
constitutional 'problem, however, and are of little value as precedents.
In an earlier study, focused on the well-known Massachusetts case of Mil-
liken v. Pratt,20 2 one of -the authors discussed the anomalous results produced
by reference to the law of the place of contracting in order to determine the
capacity of married women to contract.203 A -plea was made for the interpre-
statute is otherwise valid." Ibid. Thus the quotation in the text may be regarded as
inapplicable to the objection under the privileges-and-immunities clause. Apparently
Mr. Justice McKenna felt that he had disposed of that objection by the assertion that
dower was not a privilege of citizenship. We regard this portion of the opinion, however,
as the only portion capable of sustaining the ruling under the privileges-and-immunities
clause.
199. See also Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 137 (1891).
200. Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191 (1866) ; Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N.W. 222
(1881).
201. Pratt v. Tefit, supra note 200, at 198, 201.
202. 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241 (1878).
203. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Methrad, 25
U. Cm. L. Rxv. 227 (1958).
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tation of laws incapacitating married women in the light of the policy of such
laws and of the interest of the state in applying them in a given situation. Thus
a state having a policy of protecting married women against liability has an
interest in applying the policy for .the protection of resident married women,
irrespective of where -the contract is made or who the creditor is. But if the
married woman is a nonresident such a state has no interest in protecting her;
and if .the promisee is a resident, the state's selfish interests would dictate that
he be allowed to recover against -the foreign married woman. In support of
such a result, it may be pointed out that if the state of the married woman's
residence does not impose such an incapacity, to apply the protective law of
the forum would not advance the interests of any state, and would defeat the
interest of the forum in the security of transactions. 2 4
If it is unqualifiedly true that a classification in terms of residence is reason-
able when the line is drawn where the interest of the state in applying its policy
ends, such a result would not offend the privileges-and-immunities clause. The
earlier study, however, reached a different conclusion. To hold the protective
policy inapplicable to cases in which the creditor is a local resident and the
married woman a foreigner
.. denies to foreign married women an immunity enjoyed by local mar-
ried women, -for no reason except that they are foreign. Not only does
such discrimination offend -the sense of fairness; in all probability it is un-
constitutional, applied to citizens of other states of the Union, as an in-
fringement of the privileges-and-immunities clause of Article IV, Section
2.... In [certain] ... cases, the fact of residence has some significance,
apart from the largely coincident fact of citizenship, tending to make the
classification a reasonable one.... We may concede that there is no such
redeeming significance in the circumstance of residence in the case we are
discussing... The truth is that [the suggested limitation of the applica-
bility of the law seeks] . . . advancement of the selfish interests of [the
state having the protective policy] ... without regard to other considera-
tions.205
Doubts -have been suggested as to the necessity of this limitation upon the
analysis of conflict-of-laws problems in terms of governmental interests. There
is appeal in the proposition, persuasively urged by counsel for the California
Industrial Accident Commission in -the Qaong Ham WYah case,200 that a classi-
fication coterminous with state interests is reasonable. After full reconsidem-
204. Id. at 238. The question may be raised: Under what law would such a rtsult b.
reached? There is no apparent basis for applying the law of the married womn's
residence; and the law of the forum "incapacitates married women." The answer is that
it would be reached by applying the law of the forum, more discriminatingly interpreted.
Certainly it would be possible to draft the law of the forum in such a %way as to make it
clear that the general principle is that written promises, voluntarily made for a valuable
consideration, will be enforced; and that the rule concerning married women's contracts
is a narrowly defined exception for the benefit of resident married women. And even
if it is not so explicit, the law can be construed as if it were drafted in this way.
205. Id. at 255.
206. See text at note 125 supra.
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tion, however, we adhere to the view earlier stated: to deny the protection of
the law concerning married women's contracts to residents of other states as
such, where the creditor is a local resident, is a denial of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship. Certainly there is here no such independent ground
for distinguishing between -resident and nonresident married women as there
was in the dower case.2 0 7 Such doubt as persists we resolve in favor of a broad
interpretation of the constitutional policy against discrimination, in accordance
with the intention stated in Part I.
We adhere also to the intermediate solution suggested in the earlier study:
while the protective policy is not to be withheld from -foreign married women
merely because they are foreign, it should not be indiscriminately extended to
all foreign married women:
The essential objective ... is not graspingly to promote the interests of
local creditors at the expense of foreign debtors. It is simply to avoid the
anomaly of defeating the reasonable expectations of local creditors without
advancing any interest of the foreign state. This objective can be attained
if the immunity conferred by the act is extended to the nonresident mar-
ried woman who enjoys a similar immunity under -the law of the state
of her residence, but withheld from those who have been emancipated by
their home states....
This is clearly not a denial of the privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship. Al11 married women are divided into two classes on a reasonable
basis: those who are protected by the laws of their home states, and those
who are not.20 8
This kind of solution is available, however, only in a limited number of type
cases.20 9 Such a solution is not possible unless it can be reasonably maintained
that the state has two relevant policies, e.g., a general policy of security of
transactions and an exceptional policy of protecting local married women. In
another problem-situation that has been analyzed -from the point of view of
governmental interests-survival of personal-injury claims against the estates
of deceased tortfeasors-no such dual policy can be discerned, and no such in-
termediate solution seems defensible.210 The rule of abatement on death of the
tortfeasor can most intelligibly tbe interpreted as expressing a policy for the
207. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., supra note 192.
208. Currie, sitpra note 203, at 256-57. In fact, as applied by the courts of a state
having such a protective policy, such a rule would operate precisely as would a choice-of-
law rule referring questions of capacity to the domiciliary law. The difference between
this proposal and such a choice-of-law rule is that we would not expect the state of the
creditor's residence, if it has no such protective policy, to apply the protective law of the
married woman's domicile.
209. The concept of "similarity" of the protection accorded by the state of the married
woman's residence may involve difficulties of administration. Perhaps a better formulation
would be that the forum in the case supposed should apply the law of the married woman's
domicile, or of the forum, in such a way as to produce the least interference with freedom
of contract, i.e., to give the lesser degree of protection.
210. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication verms Autonation in the Con-
flict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rzv. 205 (1958).
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benefit of those interested in the estate of the deceased; the living are not to be
mulcted for the wrongs of the dead.211 When a state legislature abrogates that
common-law rule, allowing suit against the personal representative, it adopts
instead a policy for -the benefit of the victim, and primarily of those victims
within the sphere of its own governmental concern: residents of the state, and
others injured within the state. Can it be said that the state retains a general
policy of protecting estates against liability for the wrongs of the deceased,
subject to an exception in favor of local victims? Such a proposition is im-
plausibleY2 To withhold from citizens of other states, injured outside the
state, the right to sue the personal Tepresentative in local courts, while grant-
ing -the right to residents similarly injured, would rather clearly be a denial
of the privileges and immunities of citizenship, and this though the classifica-
tion were in terms of residence rather than citizenship.21  To extend the
privilege to nonresidents injured outside the state only if their home states
give -them similar "protection" would be "not so much a differential treatment
in good -faith of persons differently situated as a mere attempt to preclude
recovery by as many foreigners as .possible."21 4
It may be that such intermediate solutions, based upon classifying persons
according to the laws of their home states, are appropriate only when the
policy in question is one of protective incapacity. At any rate, we are not aware
of any situation not involving capacity in which such a classification could be
plausibly defended, with one possible exception. A North Carolina statute pro-
hibits deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgages.2 15 Rather clearly,
the policy of the statute is to protect purchasers against what is considered an
improvident agreement by casting upon the seller-mortgagee the risk of in-
adequacy of the security.2 10 It should therefore be consistently applied (by
North Carolina courts) to protect North Carolina purchasers, irrespective of
where the mortgaged property is situated, or where the contract is made, or
where the seller resides. It should not be applied when neither party is con-
nected with the state. Should it be applied where the mortgagee is a resident
of North Carolina and the mortgagor a nonresident? To apply it would deprive
the mortgagee of the benefit of a bargain which is not generally condemned
as unfair; and, if -the state of the mortgagor's residence has no similar policy,
to give him the benefit of the statute would not advance the interest of any
state. Nevertheless, his claim to the protection of the privileges-and-immuni-
ties clause could be opposed only 'by a rather unconvincing assertion that the
state may draw the line of classification where its interests end-unless the
211. Id. at 220-21.
212. Id. at 225,231-32.
213. Cf. Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Wash. 1940) (where, however, the
forum state retained the common-aw rule of abatement).
214. Currie, supra note 210, at 232.
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. AxN. § 45-21.38 (1950). See Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18,
16 S.E.2d 411 (1941).
216. See Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study
i; Conflict-of-Laws Method 1960 DurE L.J. I.
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classification takes into account the law of the mortgagor's residence, as sug-
gested in the case of married women's contracts. But it would be difficult to
maintain that North ,Carolina adheres to a general policy of contract enforce-
ment, subject to a limited exception in favor of a weak and susceptible seg-
ment of its citizenry. Despite the fact that the effect of the statute may be
likened to that of the disability imposed upon infants, 217 the protected class
potentially embraces the whole -population of the state. An immunity so broad-
ly bestowed should probably be extended to citizens of other states, especially
since it would be difficult to argue plausibly that North Carolina retains any
policy for the protection of the mortgagee.2 18
It is instructive to return at this point to the problem of the Statute of
Frauds, discussed in Part 1.219 There we saw that the Delaware court's elec-
tion to treat the Delaware statute as substantive, construing it as applicable
to all contracts made in Delaware, and thus, hopefully, securing the maximum
protection for Delaware citizens, would have the effect, given the court's as-
sumptions, of protecting the foreign defendant against the Delaware plaintiff
in two of the possible cases and not protecting him in two; or, to limit the
discussion to action by the Delaware courts, the foreign defendant would be
protected against the domestic plaintiff in one of the cases and not in the other.
This is a purposeless and 'haphazard arrangement, poorly serving the declared
purpose of the statute; if the selfish interests of Delaware were really to be
advanced, protection to the foreign defendant would be denied in both cases.
But would such a denial offend the privileges-and-immunities clause? Rather
clearly it would if the classification were simply in terms of nonresidence, with-
out reference to the law of the defendant's residence. Could the constitutional
objection be met by giving the New York defendant the benefit of the New
York statute or the Delaware statute, whichever affords the lesser protection,
as suggested in the case of married women's contracts? An argument can be
made ,here, as there, that the dominant policy of Delaware is to vindicate the
expectations of promisees, and that the protective policy is a limited excep-
tion for local defendants. But the argument does not carry, in this context, the
conviction that it carries when the protective -policy is directed toward special
categories of persons who are thought to be unable to protect themselves; here
the protected category is residents of the state in general. Moreover, such an
intermediate solution for this type of problem would introduce a degree of
complexity into the administration of the statute: in every case of a Delaware
plaintiff against a foreign defendant -it would be necessary to refer to the for-
eign statute, whereas simply treating the foreign defendant as if he were a
local resident would permit the simple application of the law of the forum as
a matter of course in such cases. No harm is done if as a result the New York
defendant is given greater protection than that afforded ,him 'by the law of his
217. Id. at 19.
218. Cf. Currie, .upra note 203, at 258.
219. See -the discussion of Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 Atl. 651 (1935),
in text at notes 12-18 s=pra.
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home state. It is true that no policy of New York is thereby advanced; but on
the other hand it would be difficult to spell out a legal policy on the part of
Delaware of protecting .the resident plaintiff when the domestic statute has not
been satisfied. At all events, here again we resolve doubts in favor of the con-
stitutional policy against discrimination; the New York defendant in this
situation should be given -the same "privileges and immunities" that are en-
joyed by residents of Delaware under the Statute of Frauds, and this whether
the rejected classification be conceived in terms of citizenship or of residence.
A consequence of this conclusion is that we cannot say that a classification
coterminous with the state's interests will necessarily ithstand attack based
on the privileges-and-immunities clause. There may be situations in which such
a classification is a complete defense; but on the basis of the situations that
have 'been considered it appears that, when the lav of a state provides benefits
for its residents generally, the same benefits should be extended to citizens of
other states unless there is some substantial reason, in addition to the fact that
the governmental interests of the state do not require extension of the benefit
to foreigners, for limiting the benefit .to residents.
This in turn means that Minnesota, having decided to apply its Civil Dam-
age Act for the protection of a resident injured outside the state, must similar-
ly hold the local defendant liable for out-of-state injuries to citizens of other
states, provided -it can do so without trespassing upon the interests of other
states.22° Consideration of a similar case may lead to clarification and develop-
ment of the analysis. A statute of Missouri, that most altruistic of states, pro-
vided:
In all suits upon policies of insurance upon life hereafter issued by any
company doing business in this state, it shall be no defense that the in-
sured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the
court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at
the -time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the
policy to the contrary shall be void.ml
Twenty years after its enactment the statute was amended, for reasons that
have not been discovered, by adding the phrase, "to a citizen of this state,"
so that as amended the statute read, "In all suits upon policies of insurance
upon life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citi-
zen of this state.. ." etc. 222 In 1911, the statute being in force as amended, one
Lukens, a resident of Illinois, applied to the Chicago agent of the International
Life Insurance Company, a Missouri corporation authorized to do business
in Illinois, for a policy of life insurance which was delivered in Chicago. With-
in one year after delivery of the policy the insured committed suicide. The
widow and 'beneficiary (apparently still residing in Illinois) sued the company
in Missouri and, in response to a plea setting forth a contract provision ex-
220. The reference is to the case of Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W2d
365 (1957), discussed in text in note 172 supra.
221. 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 1.19, § 5982 (1879) (now Mo. STAT. Amin. § 376.620 (1949)).
222. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 119, § 7896 (1899) (now Mo. STAr. ,m. § 376.620 (1949)).
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cluding suicide within a year, attacked the Missouri statute as an unconstitu-
tional withholding from citizens of other states of the privileges and immunities
of citizens of Missouri. The trial court invalidated the phrase added 'by amend-
ment and allowed recovery. The Supreme -Court of Missouri reversed, pri-
maxily on the ground that -the contract was governed 'by the laws of Illinois,
where it was made.223 If the insured had been a citizen of Missouri, however,
the case would -have fallen squarely within the language of the statute, not-
withstanding that the contract was made in Illinois. In that event, Missouri
might have held .the defense precluded by the statute.224 If so, must it also hold
that the defense is precluded where the insured is a citizen of another state?
We -think not. Not only does Missouri 'have no interest in applying the statute
for the benefit of a nonresident, but Illinois has an interest in securing free-
dom of contract to Missouri insurance companies licensed to do business in
Illinois with respect to contracts resulting from the transaction of busincss in
Illinois. That -the law of the place of contracting was not, as such, decisive, was
clearly settled, as the Missouri court probably knew. This statute could not
have been constitutionally applied to a policy on the life of a resident of New
Mexico issued by a New York company, even though the company was
licensed in Missouri and even though the contract was made in Missouri. 225
Yet the geographical seting of the transaction is not without constitutional
significance. The "place where the contract is made," in terms of the law of
offer and acceptance, is indeed irrelevant; but the result in such a case would
turn upon whether or not the policy could be identified as one arising out of
the business transacted 'by the company in Illinois. If it were a product of the
company's Missouri ,business, -the privileges-and-immunities clause would re-
quire that the statute be administered for the benefit of citizens of other 'states
in the same way as for Missouri citizens.
226
223. Lukens v. International Life Ins. Co., 269 Mo. 574, 191 S.W. 418 (1917); writ
of error dismissed "per stipulation," 248 U.S. 596 (1919).
224. As, somewhat similarly, the Minnesota court held the Civil Damage Act applicable
as between Minnesota parties although the place of injury was Wisconsin. Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel, supra note 220; cf. Bowen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 298, 300
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941). This is not to say that Missouri would
necessarily, or should, so hold. Missouri might reasonably assert an interest in so protecting
its residents, and if so the holding should survive attack under the due-process and full-
faith-and-credit clauses. It might with equal or greater reason conclude that it should
not in such manner interfere in the business transacted by domestic corporations in other
states, thus creating interstate conflicts. "It is evidently the policy of this State to leave
. . . [domestic] insurers which operate in other States on the basis of equality where
the laws of such States place them." 269 Mo. at 587, 191 S.W. at 422.
225. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). The Head case was cited
by the Missouri court, 269 Mo. at 582, 191 S.W. at 420. See also Bowen v. New York Life
Ins. Co., supra note 224, following the Lukens case.
226. The court left this question open, implying that if the contract had been made
in Missouri by a'citizen of another state physically present there the equal protection clause
would present a serious problem.
Without much question, the benefits of the statute must, under the equal protection
clause, be extended to residents not citizens to the same extent as to citizens.
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A United States district court in Missouri ,has held the contrary--errone-
ously, we submit. '7 The company, a Missouri corporation (not licensed to do
business in California, so far as appears), issued a policy to a citizen of Cali-
fornia in a direct-mail transaction. The court held the Missouri suicide statute
unavailable to the widow-beneficiary, a citizen of Texas, on three grounds:
(1) the contract, having been made in California, was governed by California
law; (2) any discrimination based upon citizenship was directed against the
insured, and the beneficiary lacked standing to complain of it; and (3) the
rights conferred by the M\Iissouri statute were not "fundamental."' ms Thus the
court was misled by three false guideposts: (1) the conventional rule for
choice of law; (2) Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.;2" and (3) Corfield v.
Coryell.2 30
VI. ACCESS To COURTS
The right "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state" was acknowledged to be a privilege or immunity of citizenship, pro-
tected by the -Constitution, in the pioneer federal court decision construing the
clause.231 For years, therefore, many state courts doubted or denied their
power to employ anything resembling the modem doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. 2-m The decision of -the Supreme Court in Douglas v. New York, NB.
& H.R.R.- 3 should have put an end to such doubts; that it has not altogether
succeeded in doing so is attributable in good part to Mr. Justice Holmes' curt
and unsatisfactory disposition of the problem. To a considerable extent he re-
lied upon the -facile distinction between residence and citizenship, discrediting
the perfectly sound decision in Blake v. McChm 24 without overruling it, and
thus leaving confusion. But if there is any substantial offense to constitutional
principles in a policy of dosing the doors of a state's courts to controversies
between people from other states, that offense cannot be exorcised by the soph-
istry -that a hypothetical citizen of the forum state who is a nonresident is simi-
larly denied access to the courts, while a hypothetical citizen of another state
residing in the forum will be heard. Only in one brief sentence did Mr. Justice
Holmes suggest an adequate ground for sustaining such a policy, and even
then the Teasoning was dubious in part: "There are manifest reasons for pre-
227. Wheeler v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n of America, 247 Fed. 6177 (W.D. Mo.
1918).
228. Only one circumstance prevents the decision from being squarely in conflict
with the position stated in the text: we do not know with certainty that Missouri would
have extended the benefit of the statute to a citizen of Missouri in the same circumstances.
It should so extend the statute; if it does, it should also extend it to citizens of other states.
229. 207 U.S. 142 (1907), discussed in text at note 262 infra.
230. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), discussed at note 36 supra.
231. 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
232' See Annot., 32 A.L.R. 6 (1924). New York was a conspicuous exception.
Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (1859); Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N.Y. 420, 24 N.E. 949
(1890); Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1904).
233. 279 U.S. 377 (1929), discussed in text at note 91 supra.
234. 172 U.S. 239 (1898), discussed in -text at notes 44, 78-82 supra.
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ferring ,residents in access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience
and in the fact that 'broadly speaking it is they who pay -for maintaining the
Courts concerned. 2 3 5 It has already 'been noted that the word "citizens" could
be substituted for "residents" without in the least impairing the soundness of
the statement. It should 'be added that -the fact -that local residents or citizens
primarily bear the cost of local facilities does not of itself justify refusal of
their use to citizens of other states. Thus the right of ingress and egress 210
could hardly 'be denied on the ground that local citizens and residents bear
most of the cost of' the ,highways and of police protection.
In the more "ecent case of Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield,287
all nine justices assumed that the sole test of validity 'for a state's policy of
forum non conveniens, so far as the privileges and immunities clause is con-
cerned, is whether the policy is stated and administered in accordance with the
concept of residence as distinguished from citizenship.238 The majority posi-
tion was that Missouri was free under the Constitution to decline to adjudicate
actions between nonresidents for foreign torts, and that since Missouri had
perhaps exercised jurisdiction under the mistaken apprehension of constitu-
tional compulsion, the case should 'be remanded -for determination of the ques-
tion whether the doctrine of -forum non conveniens was recognized by Mis-
souri law.
By reason of the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause of 'the Constitution, a
State may not discriminate against citizens of sister States. Art. IV, § 2.
Therefore Missouri cannot allow suits 'by nonresident Missourians -for lia-
bility under the Federal Employers' Liability Act arising out of conduct
outside that State and discriminatorily deny access to its courts to a non-
'resident who is a citizen of another State.230
W.-hile four justices dissented, 240 they disagreed as to how the lower court's
statement as to the posture of Missouri law should be interpreted. The Mis-
souri court 'had said: "Since Missouri does allow its citizens to maintain Fed-
eral Employers' Liability actions in its courts, . . . it follows that not to allow
citizens of other states the right to file Federal Employers' Liability 'suits in
our courts would violate Article 4, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United
States."124' To the dissenters it seemed clear enough that Missouri would in
no circumstances deny one of its citizens, though a nonresident, the right to
sue in Missouri for injuries sustained elsewhere; it followed 'that the Consti-
235. 279 U.S. at 387.
236. See text at notes 58-60 supra.
237. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
238. The portion of Mr. Justice Holme's opinion in the Douglas case referring to
the cost of maintaining the courts, see text at note 235 supra, was not quoted. Blake v.
McClung, supra note 234, was not cited.
239. 340 U.S. at 3-4.
240. Id. at 6.
241. Ibid., quoting Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 359 'Mo. 827, 839, 224
S.W2d 105. 110 (1949).
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tution precluded denial of the same right to a citizen of another state. Hence
there was no point in remanding.
Talk of the distinction between residence and citizenship, like the patter of
the prestidigitator, tends to divert attention from what is happening.2-l Be-
neath the surface plausibility of such talk the Supreme Court is saying to the
State of Missouri a shocldng thing: The price you must pay, if you wish to
adhere to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is that you must close the
doors of your courts to those of your own citizens who Teside outside the state
and are injured outside the state by nonresidents. Missouri replied: We will
not pay that price.
The policy of this state has been to bar none of its citizens from its
courts where there is proper venue and jurisdiction of the parties and
subject-matter, and this applies to citizens who are residents as well as
nonresidents....
Since the policy of this state has been, and is, to allow citizens of Mis-
souri (resident and nonresident) to bring and maintain suits under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act in the courts of this state, we cannot
bar citizens of other states from doing likewise.2 4
3
The Supreme Court required that Missouri, in order to avoid conflict with
the privileges-and-immunities clause, pursue a course which in the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Missouri was in conflict with the fundamental rights
of citizenship, and which in our judgment is in conflict with the equal-protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The question whether a state may deny access to its courts to a nonresident
citizen seems never to have been squarely presented, no doubt because the non-
resident domicilary is so rare as to make the distinction between residence
and citizenship quite artificial; but few courts have ever denied a forum to
their own residents because the cause of action arose outside the state and ivas
asserted against a nonresident.2 " The reasoning of decisions upholding the
right of residents to sue is equally applicable to citizens, and is sometimes made
applicable to citizens in so many words. Thus Missouri, in an earlier case:
[T]he courts of -this State were created -by her citizens, primarily for
their own use, and, secondarily, for the use of those who may sue there-
in, under the laws of the United States, or those of comity. To compel a
242. The analogy is not perfect since in this case the talk deceives the performer as
well as the audience.
243. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 362 Mo. 101, 107, 109, 240 S.W2d
106, 103-09 (1951). This is not to imply that Missouri would have embraced forum non
conveniens if it could have done so w ithout excluding nonresident citizens. Indications
are that the state welcomed litigation by nonresidents generally.
244. A few states have refused to entertain actions for wrongful death occurring out-
side the state even when all parties belong to the forum state, but the practice has been
condemned on consitutional grounds. See Currie, The C nstitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, 73 HAv. L. REv. 36 (1959). Texas has refused to entertain suits by resi-
dents predicated on the law of Mexico, Mexican Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W.
857 (1896); cf. Slater v. Mexican Natl Ry., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), but the practice has
been protested. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Mitten, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 653, 36 SV. 28 (1896).
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citizen of this State under like circumstances to go to Illinois against his
will and sue on such a policy, issued -there, when service might 'be had
'here, would be an outrage, and unwarranted by any authority that we
have been able to find 45
And New York:
The courts of this state were primarily for the residents of this state.
There must ,be some forceful and controlling reason entering into the very
nature and essence of the action which would close their doors to its own
citizens....
A selection between resident plaintiffs--opening the courts to one and
closing -them to -the other-would probably run counter to the constitu-
tional provisions of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States.240
The nonresident citizen remains subject to many of the obligations and respon-
sibilities of citizenship, including amenability to suit in his 'home state.247 The
primary interest of a state is the welfare of its citizens. The protection and
benefits of the state's laws are extended to others, in many cases, not as a
matter of interest 'but of grace or constitutional compulsion. How can the right
to resort to the courts of the state 'be denied -to a nonresident citizen when in
the same circumstances that right is accorded to resident aliens ?248
245. Missouri ex rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 185, 143 S.W.
483, 499 (1912). The case involved action by a nonresident against a foreign insurance
company on a policy issued in Illinois.
246. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & .Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 159, 139 N.E.
223, 225 (1923). Cf. Currie, suipra note 244, at 60-62; cf. Arizona Commercial Mining Co.
v. Iron Cap. Copper Co., 1.19 Me. 213, 110 At. 429 (1920), entertaining a suit between two
Maine corporations despite "difficulties which can be avoided without apparent hardship
to the plaintiff if it brings these suits in the courts of Arizona." Id. at 216, 110 Atl.
at 430. See also Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 499 (1853) ("That country is undutiful
and unfaithful to its citizens, which sends them out of its jurisdiction, to seek justice
elsewhere.").
In the Gregonis case the plaintiff became a resident of New York after the cause of
action arose. We do not associate ourselves with the holding that equal protection requires
that he be permitted access to New York courts in such circumstances, preferring to
postpone consideration of that question until the problem under the equal-protection clause
can be studied comprehensively.
247. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d
822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). As to taxation see CH-ATHAm5, GooaRicH, GRISWOLD & RL-SE,
CAsEs ON CoNFLicr oF LAws 719-22 (4th ed. 1957) ; cf. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
As -to the duty to testify, cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), As to the
duty of obedience to the law of the domicile in general, see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S.
69 (1941).
248. Cf. Hancock, The Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. RL-v. 535
(1959). The distinction was borrowed from cases on federal diversity jurisdiction. See
Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141 (1905). This is not the place to question its
validity in that context; yet it may be observed that the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment is: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
Lawyers in 1868 well knev the distinction between domicile and residence. See SIroitv,
CONFLIct oF LAws 39 (1834).
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It is time to abandon this facile, -transplanted, artificial, and discriminatory
distinction in the analysis of problems under the privileges-and-immunities
clause. It was first suggested -to the Court in 1898, and was rejected then.240
It was revived in the context of the xight of access to courts in a most cavalier
fashion, without adequate consideration of the problem.2 0 It is true that the
circumstance of actual residence may at times be a reasonable basis for classi-
fication 51 Beyond that, the distinction serves no useful purpose and may, in
rare cases, -unconstitutionally deprive a nonresident citizen of his right of access
to courts. In the present context, actual residence -has no such independent sig-
nificance as it had in Michigan Trust Co. v. Fcrry. 2 2
The validity of a state's policy of forum non conveniens is dependent on no
such artificially contrived justification. In the first place, the state announc-
ing such a policy disclaims any interest in providing a forum for litigation
within the scope of the policy, i.e., litigation between foreigners on causes of
action predicated on the laws of another state. The fact that a state limits its
legal policies to matters in which it 'has a legitimate interest is, while not
decisive, a step toward justification of its withholding the benefits of those
policies from citizens of other states. In the second place, the state does have
an interest in maintaining .the efficiency of its courts in the performance of
their proper function-the adjudication of cases which the state is interested
in adjudicating, and those which it has a constitutional obligation to adjudi-
cate. It has a further interest in preventing its judicial establishment from be-
ing used as an instrument of vexation and harassment, and generally in pro-
tecting it against the abuses of migratory litigation. (Note that the doctrine is
usually -limited to personal injury and wrongful death cases.) In the third
place, the state announcing such a policy evinces a decent respect for the in-
terests of other states. In migratory personal-injury litigation there is usually
another state that has at least a latent interest in protecting the defendant
against the hazards of -the plaintiff's forum-shopping, and in having the case
tried in its own courts. Sometimes this interest is made explicit by an injunc-
tion against prosecution of the action abroad ;2r33 sometimes it is made explicit
by statute.25 When it is made explicit, other states having no countervailing
interest in providing a -forum should be required by the full-faith-and-credit
clause -to respect the localizing provision of the judgment or statute.2- z Even
Texas, a state which successfully refused to recognize the localizing provision
of a New Mexico statute in an action by a resident of Arizona, -2 50 has recog-
249. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
250. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
251. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, discussed in text at note 68, supra.
252. Note 231 supra. See also LaTourette v. .fcMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
253. See James v. Grand Trunk W.RLRL, 14 Ii. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 915 (1958).
254. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.RL Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909).
255. See Currie, supra note 244, at 66-82.
256. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, note 254 supra.
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nized that such a provision is entitled to respect where the plaintiff is a resi-
dent of the localizing state.25 7 Thus to some extent a refusal to entertain litiga-
tion 'between -foreigners may 'be regarded as required 'by constitutional limita-
tions on state power; and even where the interest of the other state has not
been made explicit, the forum's deference to the latent interest of that state,
added to its interest in protecting its own courts from abuse, amply justifies
the forum non conveniens policy.
The -familiar rhetorical statements of the unqualified duty of a state to open
its courts to citizens of other states 258 are no longer to be taken literally; the
constitutionality of 'the doctrine of forum non conveniens is firmly estab-
lished.25 9 These statements do, -however, express the truth 'that the privileges-
and-immunities clause 'requires a state to open the doors of its courts to citizens
of other states who assert claims against local residents and citizens, even on
causes of action predicated upon the law of another state, if it would allow its
own citizens to assert such a cause of aotion.20° "[I]t is the duty of govern-
ments to make their citizens and persons -residing within their borders respond
to their civil obligations; any other rule would be intolerable." 20 1 In short-
range terms a state has no interest in subjecting its citizens to suits by for-
eigners; thus we have here further evidence that a classification that merely
follows the line of state interests is not necessarily proof against attack under
the privileges-and-immunities clause. In the long run, however, the interests
of the state would be best served 'by a less provincial attitude; and one of the
257. Southern Pac. Co. v. Dusablon, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 106 S.W. 766 (1907).
258. See Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Cole v. Cun-
ningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1890).
259. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
260. The privileges-and-immunities clause alone cannot remedy the injustice of Liv-
ingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (according to which
a citizen of another state may be deprived of all remedy because the forum state refuses
to entertain an action on the ground that it is local, being for trespass to foreign land),
since the forum state similarly denies relief to its own citizens. But it may some day
come to be recognized that the denial of relief to citizens of the forum state is a denial of
equal protection of the laws because the circumstance that foreign land is involved does
not provide a reasonable basis for classification. Cf. Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v.
Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 Me. 213, 110 Atl. 429 (1920). In that event the privileges-
and-immunities clause will require that citizens of other states be heard in similar actions.
The statement in the text should not be interpreted as suggesting that the forum state
is obliged to apply the foreign law. See text at note 267 infra.
With respect to corporate defendants the statement in the text presents problems which
we do not here undertake to resolve. For example, in Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court said that due process did not require Ohio
to provide a forum for a suit by a nonresident against a Philippine corporation whose
affairs were being managed in that state, although war conditions at the time the suit
was brought apparently prevented suit in the Philippines. The privileges-and-immunilties
clause wvas not discussed. There is also the question whether a state would be required
to entertain an action by a citizen of another state against a purely local enterprise
incorporated for convenience in another state such as Delaware. See note 18, supra,
261. Annot., 32 A.L.R. 6, 26 (1924).
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basic -values of federal union is that the fundamental compact between the
constituent states can secure the right of access to courts on a basis of mutual-
ity, -thus avoiding the cycle of retaliation and reciprocity. The privileges-and-
immunities clause cannot mean tess than this.
Moreover, the privilege of access to courts should be freed of the strangu-
lating interpretation placed upon it by the Supreme Court in wrongful death
cases. In Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,2G the Court sustained an Ohio
statute providing in effect that no action for death caused by wrongful act or
default in another state could be brought in Ohio unless the deceased were a
citizen of Ohio. The statute was the rankest sort of attempt to discriminate
against citizens of other states; yet the Court, speaking through Mr. justice
Moody, upheld it -by insisting that there was no discrimination against the
plaintiff-the widow and personal representative-on the ground of citizen-
ship. There was no inquiry into the reasonableness of the classification in terms
of the citizenship of the deceased. Mr. justice Harlan, joined by justices White
and McKenna, dissented:
[E]very citizen of Ohio, when in another State, for whatever purpose,
is accompanied by the assurance on the part of his State that its courts
will be open for suit by his widow or representative if -his death, while in
another State, is caused by the negligence or default of another person or
company. But that privilege is denied by the Ohio statute to the repre-
sentative of citizens of other States -meeting death under like circum-
stances. Indeed, if a citizen of Ohio should go into another State and while
there willfully, or by some wrongful act, neglect or default on his part,
cause the death of someone, although he might be liable to a suit for dam-
ages in the State where death occurred, yet if sued for damages in the
courts of his own State, -he need only plead in bar of the action in Ohio
that the decedent was not, at the time of his death, a citizen of Ohio....
The case is plainly one in which Ohio attempts, in reference to certain
kinds of actions that are maintainable in perhaps every State of the Union,
including Ohio, to give to its own citizens privileges which it denies,
under like circumstances, to citizens of other States. To a citizen of Ohio
it says: "If you go into Pennsylvania, and are killed there, in consequence
of -the negligence or default of some one, your ividow may have access to
the Ohio courts in a suit for damages, provided the wrongdoer can be
reached in Ohio by service of process." But to the citizen of Pennsylvania
it says: "If you come to your death in that State by Teason of the neg-
ligence or default of some one, even if the swrongdoer be a citizen of Ohio,
your widow shall not sue the Ohio wrongdoer in an Ohio court for dam-
ages because, and only because, you -are a citizen of another State." This
is an illegal discrimination against living citizens of other States, and the
difficulty is not met by the suggestion that no discrimination is made
against the widow of the deceased because of her citizenship in another
State.26 3
262. 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
263. 207 U.S. 151, 157, 159-60 (1907). (Emphasis in the original.) Mr. Justice
Holmes concurred in the result reached by the majority on the apparent ground that the
Court lacked power to extend the benefits of the statute to persons not within its coverage.
Id. at 151 ; cf. note 121 supra.
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The reasoning of this dissent is unanswerable.26 The Chambers case should
be overruled.
It does not follow, however, that Ohio would be required to entertain a case
precisely like the Chambers case. There the defendant was a foreign corpora-
tion ;265 the deceased and the widow were both citizens of Pennsylvania; the
injury and death occunred in Pennsylvania; Ohio law was inapplicable. There
was no apparent reason why the action should have been brought in Ohio
rather than in Pennsylvania or Maryland. If Ohio has a policy of forum non
conveniens it may -refuse to entertain the act-ion on that ground. The Constitu-
tion does not require Ohio to entertain an action for the benefit of citizens of
other states for foreign tort where the defendant is a nonresident or a foreign
corporation.266
Nor does it follow that in such an action against an Ohio defendant Ohio
would be required to apply the law of Pennsylvania, despite a faint intimation
to that effect in Hughes v. Fetter.2 6 7 In that case, -holding that full faith and
credit obliged Wisconsin to entertain a cause of action for wrongful death in
Illinois (though not -that Wisconsin must apply the substantive law of Illinois),
-the Court distinguished Chambers on the ground that the full-faith-and-credit
clause was not there invoked. But we submit that full faith and credit does not
require a forum in cases of the Chambers type, much less that the law of the
place of injury be applied. If a forum is required in that type of case (as it is
when the defendant is a citizen or resident of the forum state), it is by virtue
of -the privileges-and-immunities clause, which implies no obligation to apply
any law other than that which would be applied if the plaintiff were a citizen
of the forum state.268 The interest of Ohio in her own citizens and residents,
sued in Ohio courts, will justify the application of Ohio law for their protec-
tion. Thus if the maximum recovery under the Ohio wrongful death statute is
less than that permitted 'by the state of injury or of the residence of the de-
ceased, or if contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery under Ohio
law, but not under the law of -the other state, Ohio would be justified in apply-
264. See Currie, supra note 244, 47 n.46, 59 n.90.
The New York courts, in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, have in-
dicated that in wrongful death cases it is not the citizenship of the plaintiff administrator
that is controlling, Pietraroia v. New Jersey & H.R. Ry. & Ferry Co., 131 App. Div.
829, 116 N.Y. Supp. 249 (1909), aff'd an dther grounds, 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120 (1910),
and further that, as between the deceased and the beneficiary, it is the residence of the de-
ceased that is the important consideration. Zeikus v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 153 App.
Div. 345, 351, 138 N.Y. Supp. 478, 482 (1912). See also Note, 28 COLUM. L. RL-v. 347,
351 n.31 (1928).
265. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad is, and always has been, a Maryland corpora-
tion. MooDy's TRANSPORTATION MANUAL 177 (1958).
266. Note that the vice of the Ohio statute would not be cured if the word "resident"
were substituted for "citizen." By force of the equal protection clause the statute as it
stands includes residents, since to allow actions for the foreign deaths of citizens and
deny them for the foreign deaths of residents not citizens would be arbitrary.
267. 341 U.S. 609, 611 n.6 (1951).
268. See Currie, supra note 244, at 59 n.90.
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ing its own law; thereby it would give to citizens of other states the same pro-
tection it gives to its own.
It may be suggested that Ohio might go farther and limit the recovery in
the case of the nonresident decedent to that allowed by the state of his resi-
dence, if the Ohio law is more generous. An argument could be made in sup-
port of such a suggestion by analogy to the solution suggested in this paper for
the case of the incapacitated married woman. We reject such an argument
here. The .privileges or benefits of the wrongful death statute are extended
generally to citizens and residents of Ohio, not to classes of residents especial-
ly in need of protection. Having imposed the more stringent liability on its
own citizens for the sake of its own citizens, Ohio should extend the same
benefits to citizens of other states.269 It may be observed that by referring to
the law of the place of injury (assuming that to be also the residence of the
injured or deceased person), conventional doctrine does limit recovery to that
provided by the law of his home state, while potentially subjecting the domes-
tic tortfeasor to a liability greater than that imposed by the law of the forum.
Would it not be more reasonable and consonant with the constitutional scheme
to assure the nonresident as much as, and not more than, the law of the forum
provides for its own citizens?
The only remaining decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the privi-
leges-and-immunities clause in the context of private law are two concerning
allegedly discriminatory application of the forum's statute of limitations. The
problems presented are somewhat similar to those posed by simple refusal to
entertain the action brought by a nonresident, and have been so treated by the
Court.
In Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery2 7 0 a New York corporation sued a
citizen and resident of Wisconsin in his home state on a judgment recovered
in New York. The action was barred by Wisconsin's ten-year statute of limi-
tations, but would not have been barred had the plaintiff been a resident of
Wisconsin. The Wisconsin law, as paraphrased by the Supreme Court, was to
the effect that "[w]hen the defendant is out of the State, the Statute of Limi-
tations shall not run against the plaintiff, if the latter resides in the State, but
269. Such a suggestion may deserve consideration, however, in connection with national
law at the level of international conflicts. In Romero v. International Terminal Operating
C., 358 US. 354 (1959), the Court held the Jones Act and the general American maritime
law inapplicable in an action by a Spanish seaman against his Spanish employer for injuries
sustained on board ship in New York Harbor. An important consideration was that Ameri-
can standards of compensation would yield a recovery disproportionate to that provided by
Spanish law, and so would interfere with international commerce while giving the plaintiff
far more than would be recovered by his fellow crewmen injured elsewhere. Yet the case
was allowed to proceed against alleged joint tortfeasors who were Americans. See Currie,
The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CH. L. Rzv. 1 (1959).
Since neither the privileges-and-immunities clause nor the equal-protection clause is op-
erative in such a case (even in a state court), the plaintiff might well be limited to the
protection afforded him by the law of his home country.
270. 93 U.S. 72 (1876).
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shall, if he resides out of the State.12 71 The defendant had moved to Wisconsin
within ten years prior to the filing of the action, and the plaintiff claimed the
same time to sue that the statute accorded to residents of Wisconsin.27 2 The
Court, 'however, affirmed a judgment for the defendant:
There is, in fact, a valid reason for the discrimination. If the statute does
not Tun as between non-resident creditors and their debtors, it might often
happen that a Tight of action would be extinguished, perhaps for years,
in the State where the parties reside; and yet, if the defendant should be
found in Wisconsin,-it may be only in a railroad train,-a suit could be
sprung upon him after the claim had been forgotten. The laws of Wis-
consin would thus 'be used as a trap to catch the unwary defendant, after
the -laws which had always governed the case had barred any recovery.
This would be inequitable and unjust....
It is also to be considered, that a personal obligation is due at the
domicile of the obligee. It is the duty of the debtor to seek the creditor,
and -pay him his debt, at the residence of the latter. Not doing this, 'he
is guilty of laches against the law of the creditor's domicile, as well as his
own. But he evades this law 'by absenting 'himself from the jurisdiction.
As long as he does this, the Statute of Limitations of that jurisdiction
ought not to run to the creditor's prejudice. This cannot be said with
regard to the non-resident creditor. It is not the laws of Wisconsin any
more than -those of China which his non-resident debtor contemns by non-
payment of the debt, and absence from the State: it is the laws of some
other State. Therefore, 'there is no -reason why -the Statute of Limitations
of Wisconsin should not run as against the non-resident creditor; at least,
there is not -the same reason which exists in the case of the resident cred-
itor.2 78
This 'holding is susceptible of the following rearrangement and restatement:
Wisconsin has an interest dn providing a forum in which its residents may as-
ser their claims against debtors, domestic and foreign, and in allowing a Tea-
sonable time for the filing of such claims. That time is not to 'be diminished
by any period during which the defendant's absence from the state makes it
impossible for the plaintiff to serve process on him there. But Wisconsin has
no interest in similarly providing a forum and a minimum period in which suit
may 'be brought for residents of other states. If there were nothing more than
this negative--this lack of interest in the welfare of citizens of other states-
it might -be argued persuasively -that the Constitution requires Wisconsin to
place .them on an equal footing with its own residents in this respect. But there
is more. If Wisconsin were as a matter of course to extend the same protec-
tion to nonresidents, it would, at least in some cases, find itself seriously inter-
fering with the interests of other states-as, for example, that of the state in
which the debtor resides, which has an interest in protecting him against stale
271. Id. at 76.
272. Although the Court had held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868),
that a corporation is not a citizen within the protection of the clause, it preferred to rest
this decision on 'the "broad ground" of no discrimination rather than upon the status of the
plaintiff. 93 U.S. at 78.
273. Id. at 77.
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ilaims. With no countervailing interest of its own at stake, Wisconsin cannot
legitimately impair the interests of other states; and its denial of the protec-
tion of the statute to nonresidents is a reasonable means of avoiding such im-
pairment.
The reasoning in Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen 2 14 is less satisfactory, but the
considerations justifying the result are similar. The Minnesota "borrowing"
statute provided:
When a cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by the laws
of the place where it arose, an action thereon is barred by lapse of time,
no such action shall be maintaind [sic] in this state unless the plaintiff be
a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it
accrued. 2 5
The plaintiff, a citizen of South Dakota, sued the defendant, a Canadian cor-
poration, in Minnesota for injuries sustained in Canada. Under the borrow-
ing statute the cause of action was barred by the Canadian statute of limita-
tions (one year); the Minnesota statute of limitations, of which a citizen of
Minnesota could .take advantage, allowed six years. The Court affirmed a judg-
ment -or -the defendant, noting -that "[i]t is plain that the act assailed was not
enacted for the purpose of creating an arbitrary or vexatious discrimination
against non-residents of Minnesota.' 2 76 Beyond this, the opinion contributes
little more than what is contained in a sentence: "[T]he constitutional require-
ment is satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the State
upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforc-
ing of any Tights he may 'have, even though they may not be technically and
precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens.' *- 7 No im-
portance was attached to the use in the statute of the word "citizen," which is
as it should be since the equal protection clause would require that the same
protection be extended to residents other than citizens. Again the persuasive
ground ,for the decision is that Minnesota had an interest in providing a period
of years in which its residents could sue on foreign causes of action; it was
justified in asserting that interest though in so doing it would come in conflict
with the interest of the state of the defendant's domicile in protecting it against
stale claims; but Minnesota had no interest in providing a similarly long period
during which a nonresident could sue the foreign defendant; and to extend
the privilege to nonresidents would have been, in the case before the Court,
dearly to impair the interest of the foreign state without the justification of
advancing any interest of its own. Avoidance of that result-which even with
respect to a foreign country may amount to a denial of due process 278-Nvas
a reasonable basis for classification.
274. 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
275. Id. at 558.
276. Id. at 559.
277. Id. at 562.
278. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (concerning, however, a fureign
contractual time limitation rather than a foreign statute).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Problems of discrimination are inherent in conflict-of-laws cases. These pro-
blems are not avoided but only obscured by the system of purportedly imper-
sonal choice-of-law rules. Such ,rules are often discriminatory, sometimes
against domestic people and sometimes against citizens of other states. More-
over, such -rules often deny legitimate self-interest, or lead to intrusion upon
the concerns of other states, and sometimes result in the unjustifiably retro-
active dislocation of settled rights, thus resulting in serious constitutional prob-
lems in addition to problems of discrimination.
This review of Supreme Court decisions involving the privileges-and-im-
munities clause in the context of private law suggests the following conclu-
sions :279
In general, the rights and privileges -that are involved in private litigation in
the field of conflict of laws--such ordinary rights as dower, workmen's com-
pensation, recovery -for wrongful death, parity of treatment for creditors, the
protection of a statute of limitations or a statute of frauds-are within the
protection of the clause. It is not necessary to establish that a privilege or
immunity is "fundamental" or that -it "pertains to" citizenship as such.
The test of the validity of excluding citizens of other states from enjoyment
of a privilege or immunity enjoyed by local citizens or residents is the reason-
ableness of -the classification.
The validity of a classification is not established merely because it is in
terms of residence rather than citizenship, nor is it destroyed merely 'because
it is in terms of citizenship -rather than residence; but actual residence may in
some circumstances 'have a significance tending to establish the Teasonableness
of the classification.
Other constitutional limits on the power of a state of course constitute a
reasonable basis for classification; that is to say, a state may without offense
to the privileges-and-immunities clause decline to apply its law for the benefit
of a citizen of another state if to do so would violate the full-faith-and-credit
clause or the due-process clause. Perhaps we may go farther and say that even
though it is not clear that the limits of state power would be exceeded by ex-
tension of the 'benefits of local law to citizens of other states, uncertainty about
those limits and a purpose not to exceed them constitute a Teasonable basis for
the classification.8S Probably also a purpose not to intrude upon the interests
of a foreign state, as distinguished from another state of the Union, is a rea-
sonable 'basis for classification.
The fact that a state has no interest in extending the protection of its laws
to nonresidents, even if there is added the fact that no declared policy of a
sister state will be advanced 'by extending the protection, is probably not suf-
279. So far as we are aware, there has been no previous general study of the impact
of the privileges-and-immunities clause on conflict-of-laws problems. For this reason,
among others, the present study is not regarded as definitive but only as tentative and
exploratory.
280. See text at notes 167, 273 supra.
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ficient, in general, to justify a classification excluding citizens of other states.
When the benefits of a law are potentially available to the population of the
state in general, and when extension of its benefits to citizens of other states
would advance the mutual interests of all states by avoiding the cycle of re-
taliation and reciprocity, the Constitution requires such extension.
In certain cases, e.g., where the benefits of a law are not designed for the
population of the state in general, but for groups of persons deemed to be in
need of special protection, as, -or example, laws incapacitating married women,
a classification excluding some citizens of other states may be reasonable if it
distinguishes among persons according to whether or not they are so protected
by the laws of their home states. The validity of such a classification may be
defended on the ground that such privileges or immunities are not among those
enjoyed by citizens of the state in general; it is more clearly supported by the
consideration that such a classification evinces no provincial or hostile attitude
toward citizens of other states, but reasonably distinguishes between those per-
sons who are regarded by their -home states as needing special protection and
those who are not.
The method of approach to conflict-of-laws problems that calls for their
analysis in terms of the governmental interests of the states concerned is not
vitiated, but rather vindicated, hy this review of the effect of the privileges-
and-immunities clause. That method counsels the rational, moderate, and con-
trolled pursuit of self-interest; it also counsels that self-interest should be sub-
ordinated freely, and even gladly, to the constitutional restraints required and
made possible by federal union. Under conventional conflict-of-laws doctrine,
legal scholars, and to a lesser degree the courts under their influence, because
of the compulsion of internationalist and altruist ideals, have guiltily sup-
pressed the natural instincts of community self-interest. The impersonal choice-
of-law rules that are employed in this process are themselves discriminatory
at times, and at other times enforce a purposeless self-denial, or an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the concerns of other states, or an unintended and un-
justified Tetroactive impairment of settled rights and obligations. To free our-
selves of -this neurotic condition, we need "a new sort of conscience, one which
demands a more accurate and yet more scrupulous self-centeredness." 2 1
281. RiF-7, F zmm: TEaE MIND OF THE MoRtursr 97 (1959). The quotation should be
understood simply as a literary allusion. We do not suggest that problems of conflict of
laws can be solved by psychoanalysis.
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